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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
This is an interlocutory appeal challenging an Order of Restitution granted to 
Appellee, Federal National Mortgage Association, (FNMA), following an "immediate 
occupancy hearing" held by the trial court in the course of FNMA's unlawful detainer action 
against Appellant, Lorraine Sundquist, who challenged FNMA's standing by challenging its 
claim of ownership of her Home by means of a trustee's deed from ReconTrust Company. 
Sundquist argued below that FNMA lacks standing since any purported title derived 
from ReconTrust is null and void because ReconTrust is not statutorily qualified under Utah's 
non-judicial foreclosure statutes to conduct non-judicial foreclosure sales, and therefore was 
not statutorily qualified to convey a trustee's deed to FNMA. 
The "immediate occupancy hearing" was an interim hearing purportedly held 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78B-6-810(2), and the Order of Restitution is therefore an 
interim order, although it mistakenly represents that "judgment" was issued, which was not 
accurate given the definition of "judgment" set forth in Rule 54(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This interlocutory appeal is permitted pursuant by Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Does FNMA have standing to evict Sundquist from her Home under Utah's 
unlawful detainer statutes, if FNMA's purported title to the property was received by 
means of an invalid trustee's deed from ReconTrust? 
A. Was ReconTrust an "unauthorized person" when it conducted the foreclosure 
sale at issue in this case, thereby rendering the foreclosure sale it conducted 
"unauthorized"? 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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B. Does an "unauthorized sale'5 conducted by an "unauthorized person" result in an 
"unauthorized trustee's deed" such that the purported sale of the property is null and 
void ab initio so that no transfer of any title to FNMA ever occured? 
C. Absent an "authorized sale" of Sundquist's Home to FNMA does FNMA have 
standing to assert a "right of occupancy during the litigation's pendency" in order to 
dispossess Sundquist from her Home? 
II. Did the trial court err in granting possession without first whether it had subject 
matter jurisdiction given the challenge to FNMA's standing to dispossess Sundquist 
Standard of Review: Each of the forgoing issues involve the interpretation of a statute, and 
"[t]he interpretation of a statute is a question of law that the Court shall review for 
correctness," ,4SC Utah, Inc. v Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. 2010 UT 65, 245 P.3d 184, f 11, 
giving no deference to the trial court's legal rulings. 
The question of whether FNMA has standing to assert any right to occupancy is also a 
legal question, to which this court gives no deference.1 See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994). There are no factual issues for the Court to review. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-19. Trust deeds — Definitions of terms. 
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in a trust deed as 
the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest. 
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed as security for 
the performance of an obligation. 
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with Sections 57-1-20 through 
57-1-36 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of 
1
 This is particularly true in this case where Judge Kouris did not enter any findings of fact or conclusions of law 
regarding the legal arguments made at the hearing regarding the lack of standing, but summarily denied the 
motion to "stay the eviction" (which was not even the motion before the court), and where Judge Lubeck 
subsequently summarily signed the Order of Restitution, also without making any findings of fact or conclusions 
of law. 
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an obligation of the trustor or other person named in the deed to a beneficiary. 
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed by trust deed, 
or his successor in interest. 
(5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth in Section 57-1-1. 
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the trust deed. 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications. 
(1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(i) any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place within the 
state where the trustor or other interested parties may meet with the trustee to: 
(A) request information about what is required to reinstate or payoff the 
obligation secured by the trust deed; 
(B) deliver written communications to the lender as required by both the trust 
deed and by law; 
(C) deliver funds to reinstate or payoff the loan secured by the trust deed; or 
(D) deliver funds by a bidder at a foreclosure sale to pay for the purchase of the 
property secured by the trust deed; 
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or insurance company 
authorized to do business and actually doing business in Utah under the laws of Utah 
or the United States; 
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business and actually conducting a 
trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United States; 
(iv) any title insurance company or agency that: 
(A) holds a certificate of authority or license under Title 31 A, Insurance Code, to 
conduct insurance business in the state; 
(B) is actually doing business in the state; and 
(C) maintains a bona fide office in the state; 
(v) any agency of the United States government; or 
(vi) any association or corporation that is licensed, chartered, or regulated by the Farm 
Credit Administration or its successor. 
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (1), a person maintains a bona fide office within 
the state if that person maintains a physical office in the state: 
(i) that is open to the public; 
(ii) that is staffed during regular business hours on regular business days; and 
(iii) at which a trustor of a trust deed may in person: 
(A) request information regarding a trust deed; or 
(B) deliver funds, including reinstatement or payoff funds. 
(c) This Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a trust deed existing prior to 
May 14, 1963, nor to any agreement that is supplemental to that trust deed. 
(d) The amendments in Laws of Utah 2002, Chapter 209, to this Subsection (1) apply 
only to a trustee that is appointed on or after May 6, 2002. 
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed, unless the 
beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), (iii), (v), or (vi). 
(3) The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by the 
trustee of a trust deed if the trustee is qualified under Subsection (l)(a)(i) or (iv). 
3 
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(4) A trust deed with an unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be effective to 
create a lien on the trust property, but the power of sale and other trustee powers under 
the trust deed may be exercised only if the beneficiary has appointed a qualified 
successor trustee under Section 57-1-22. 
(Emphasis added to highlight the qualifications of foreclosing trustees, as compared to other 
trustees which may be appointed but which lack legislative permission to conduct sales) 
Utah Code Annotated §57-l-22(l)(b) Successor trustees — Appointment by beneficiary — 
Effect — Substitution of trustee — Recording — Form. 
(b) The new trustee shall succeed to all the power, duties, authority, and title of the 
trustee named in the deed of trust and of any successor trustee. 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-23 Sale of trust property — Power of trustee — Foreclosure 
of trust deed. 
The trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-1-2l(l)(a)(i) or (iv) is given the 
power of sale by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust property to be sold 
in the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27, after a breach of an 
obligation for which the trust property is conveyed as security; or, at the option of the 
beneficiary, a trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the 
foreclosure of mortgages on real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the 
trustee without express provision for it in the trust deed, (emphasis added) 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-23.5 Civil liability for unauthorized person who exercises 
power of sale 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Unauthorized person" means a person who does not qualify as a trustee 
under Subsection 57-l-21(l)(a)(i) or (iv). 
(b) "Unauthorized sale" means the exercise of a power of sale by an 
unauthorized person. 
(2) (a) An unauthorized person who conducts an unauthorized sale is liable to 
the trustor for the actual damages suffered by the trustor as a result of the 
unauthorized sale or $2,000, whichever is greater. 
(b) In an action under Subsection (2)(a), the court shall award a prevailing 
plaintiff the plaintiffs costs and attorney fees. 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-24 Sale of trust property by trustee - Notice of default. 
The power of sale conferred upon the trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-
l-21(l)(a)(i) or (iv) may not be exercised until: (1) the trustee first files for record .... 
(emphasis added) 
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Utah Code Annotated §57-1-28(3) Sale of trust property by trustee - Payment of bid -
Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser — Recitals — Effect. 
(3) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, without right of 
redemption, the trustee's title and all right, title, interest, and claim of the trustor and 
the trustor's successors in interest and of all persons claiming by, through, or under 
them, in and to the property sold, including all right, title, interest, and claim in and to 
the property acquired by the trustor or the trustor's successors in interest subsequent to 
the execution of the trust deed, which trustee's deed shall be considered effective and 
relate back to the time of the sale. 
Utah Code Annotated §78B-6-802.5. Unlawful detainer after foreclosure or forced sale. 
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty of unlawful detainer if 
the person: 
(1) defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in disposition of the property by a 
trustee's sale or sheriffs sale; and 
(2) continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or sheriffs sale after being 
served with a notice to quit by the purchaser. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-809.2. Proof required of plaintiff- Defense. 
(2) In defense, the defendant may show that he or his ancestors, or those whose 
interest in the premises he claims, had been in the quiet possession of the property for 
the space of one entire year continuously before the commencement of the 
proceedings, and that his interest is not ended or determined, and that this showing is a 
bar to the proceedings. 
Utah Code Annotated §78B-6-810.2. Court procedures. 
(2) (a) In an action for unlawful detainer where the claim is for nonpayment of rent or 
for occupancy of a property after a forced sale as described in Subsection 78B-6-
802.5, the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing, upon request of either party, within 
10 days after the day on which the defendant files the defendant's answer. 
(b) At the evidentiary hearing held in accordance with Subsection (2)(a): 
(i) the court shall determine who has the right of occupancy during the litigation's 
pendency; and 
(ii) if the court determines that all issues between the parties can be adjudicated 
without further proceedings, the court shall adjudicate those issues and enter judgment 
on the merits. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal challenging an Order of Restitution issued to FNMA, 
after an "eviction hearing" held by the trial court sua sponte without any request of either 
party, whereat the issue of whether FNMA has the uright to occupancy during the litigation's 
" Although not directly affecting the outcome of this appeal, it is disturbing to note that many court clerks are 
automatically scheduling "eviction hearings" or "immediate occupancy hearings" sua sponte when a defendant 
files an answer, purportedly under UCA 78B-6-801(2), even though such hearings according to the legislature 
are only to be conducted "upon request of either party," and, under the system put in place by the legislature, the 
failure to request an 810(2) hearing in time for it to be heard within ten days of the filing of the answer would 
constitute a waiver of the 810(2) hearing, and would required a plaintiff to then post a possession bond to protect 
the defendant if plaintiff wishes to obtain possession of the property before the entry of final judgment. See 
Section 57-1-808(1). This sua sponte conduct by court clerks is altering the unlawful detainer system put in 
place by the legislature, to the detriment of defendants that would otherwise be protected by a possession bond, 
or have the opportunity to post their own counter-possession bond (which they may only do under the statute if 
the plaintiff first posts its possession bond). See Section 78b-6-808(4). It also amounts to a violation of the 
ruling in Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983) that the court should not reach out and take action on 
behalf of one party that the party has not taken for itself, since in doing so the court clerk abandons its position of 
neutrality and becomes an advocate for one side over the other, and actively aids one side over the other. In this 
case it is even more egregious since it is the court clerk effectively making the request on behalf of the plaintiff 
in order to preserve the plaintiffs interests to the detriment of the defendants, and not a judge. It certainly adds 
to the already overwhelming perception that a debtor cannot get a fair break in our current court system where 
their issues are not taken seriously simply because they are in default. 
Had the court clerk not scheduled a hearing sua sponte in this case, and had FNMA not requested a 
hearing in time for it to be heard within ten days after the filing of Sundquist's answer, then an 810(2) hearing 
would have been waived and Sundquist would either still be in her home, or she would have the protection of a 
possession bond to cover her damages and attorney fees resulting from an unlawful eviction, such as this. Others 
similarly situated to Sundquist, who are being unlawfully evicted based on invalid ReconTrust trustee's deeds, 
deserve the protection intended by the legislature that a possession bond would provide, and therefore the 
improper sua sponte scheduling of hearings by court clerks must stop. 
Furthermore, this practice is resulting in judges who are not assigned to the case nevertheless hearing 
and deciding rights to occupancy during the litigation's pendency when the court will not be overseeing the 
litigation, and therefore may not be paying adequate attention to the issues being raised in such hearings because 
the cases are not their own. This practice of substitute judges filling in tends to result in less than diligent 
attention to the arguments and issues, as occurred in this case when Judge Kouris mistakenly thought there was a 
motion "to stay eviction." It appears from the transcript that the trial court was not familiar with the case and 
was perhaps more interested in just getting through the hearing rather than seriously considering substantive 
legal issues that could and would affect the rest of the case, and entering proper findings of fact and conclusions 
of law as required by Rule 52 when evidentiary hearings are held, which is what 810(2) hearings are supposed to 
be, but seldom are. This amounts to a denial of due process since defendants routinely are not given an adequate 
opportunity to defend themselves or present their issues as they are rushed through the meat grinder that our 
court system has become for debtors who are being unlawfully evicted from their own homes. 
Since it has only been since 2009, when Subsection 78B-6-810(2) was amended to first allow such 
hearings in the case of holdovers after a forced sale, this detrimental practice is a fairly recent development. It is 
requested that the Court note the impropriety of the practice of sua sponte scheduling of 810(2) hearings that 
have not been requested by one of the parties and direct that it stop since the issue will likely not otherwise come 
before this Court directly. 
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pendency" under U.C.A. §78B-6-810(2) was decided based on FNMA's claim that it had the 
right to occupancy based upon a purported title it claimed to have acquired by means of a 
trustee's deed from ReconTrust. 
Sundquist at the hearing challenged FNMA's standing to seek any "right of 
occupancy" based on the purported ReconTrust title because ReconTrust is not a qualified 
foreclosing trustee under U.C.A. §57-1-21 and U.C.A. § 57-1-23, which explicitly require that 
a foreclosing trustee be either an attorney licensed to practice law in Utah, or a title insurance 
company or agency, maintaining a bona fide office within the state. 
It is undisputed that ReconTrust is neither, and therefore ReconTrust is an 
"unauthorized person" to execute the statutory "power of sale" created in UCA §57-1-23, and 
that any sale conducted by ReconTrust is an "unauthorized sale," as those terms were recently 
defined by the Utah Legislature. As such, any purported sale by ReconTrust is null and void 
ab initio, and could not have conveyed any title to FNMA so as to give it any ownership of 
the Home. 
Absent any ownership of the Home, FNMA obviously lacks any standing to even 
bring an unlawful detainer action, or more particularly to assert any "right of occupancy" at a 
Section 810(2) hearing. 
At the hearing, Judge Kouris ignored the challenge to FNMA's standing and the 
legislative requirements of U.C.A. §57-1-21, U.C.A. §57-1-23 and U.C.A. §57-1-24. Instead, 
it appears, given the nature of his questioning, that he based his unexplained ruling solely on 
the simple fact that Sundquist was in "default" on her loan. No finding of fact or conclusion 
of law was ever made by Judge Kouris that FNMA in fact or law actually owned the Home or 
had standing to seek occupancy, despite the legal challenge to FNMA's title and standing 
7 
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having been directly raised - and even though it is clear as a matter of law that ReconTrust is 
an "unauthorized person" who conducted an "unauthorized sale," as expressly prohibited by 
the Utah Legislature, and therefore could not have possibly conveyed title to FNMA. 
Judge Lubeck subsequently signed an Order of Restitution ordering that that Sundquist 
vacate her home, again without any findings of fact or conclusion of law to support the Order. 
Sundquist sought an interlocutory appeal of the Order of Restitution and it was granted 
for this Court to determine whether FNMA has standing to evict Sundquist from her own 
Home. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Defendant Loraine Sundquist has been a resident of her home on 1599 East 12700 
South, Draper, Utah since 1996. (R P33). (Hereafter, the "Home") 
On or about 2006 Sundquist contacted American Elite Mortgage to obtain a new 
"mortgage" on her Home and she entered into a loan secured by a trust deed on her Home. (R 
P33-34). 
On January 2011, a NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE was posted on Sundquist's door 
at the direction of ReconTrust, for the purpose of foreclosing the trust deed. (R P37). 
It is undisputed that ReconTrust is not an attorney authorized to practice law in the 
State of Utah, and does not maintain an office within the State. (R. P38) 
It is also undisputed that ReconTrust is not a title insurance company or agency 
licensed in Utah, and does not maintain a bona fide office within the state as required by 
statute. (R. P38) 
8 
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On May 17, 2011, at or about 10:30 am, ReconTrust, purportedly held a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale, at which time it is unclear who supposedly made a credit bid, (and whether 
that bid was valid3) to become the supposed owner of Sundquist's Home. (R. P37) 
ReconTrust reportedly delivered a trustee's deed to FNMA purporting to convey title 
to FNMA on or about May 25, 2011. (R. P7) (See Addendum) 
On or about June 1, 2011, a Notice to Quit was posted on Sundquist's Home by 
plaintiffs counsel, claiming that FNMA now owns the Home because it bought it at the 
foreclosure sale. (R. PP48-49) 
Because Sundquist wanted to fight for her home aginst the unlawful foreclosure that 
had taken place, she remained in her home and a Complaint was filed by FNMA against 
Sundquist on June 13,2011, claiming that it owns the Home by means of the trustee's deed 
from ReconTrust and requesting the Court order Sundquist to vacate her Home. (R.PP1-15). 
On June 22, 2011, Sundquist filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (R.P28-32). 
A court clerk, upon receipt of Sundquist's Answer and Counterclaim, scheduled an 
"Eviction Hearing" on June 27, 2011, sua sponte, without any request being made therefore 
by either party as is required by UCA 78B-6-801 (2). (R.P26) 
MERS purportedly assigned to BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, "all beneficial interest under that certain deed 
of trust dated 05/02/2006, executed by; Loraine Sundquist, ... Together with the note or notes therein described 
or referred to," on or about January 7, 2011, and recorded January 21, 2011 (even though there is no evidence 
that MERS ever actually owned the note such that it could assign it - thereby breaking the chain of title) 
(hereafter the "First Corporate Assignment,")- There is a second Corporation Assignment of Deed of 
Trust/Mortgage, whereby BAC purportedly assigned "all beneficial interest under that certain deed of trust... 
Together with the note or notes therein described or referred to" to FNMA, which assignment was dated May 18, 
2011 (THE DAY AFTER THE PURPORTED FORECLOSURE SALE)(hereafter the "Second Corporate 
Assignment"). The Trustee's Deed, also dated May 18, 2011, falsely asserts that FNMA had been the successful 
bidder at the sale the day before, even though according to the First and Second Corporate Assignments FNMA 
did not own any interest in the debt until the day after the sale. If that is the case, then FNMA could not have 
legally done a credit bid on May 17th. FNMA's story is inconsistent with FNMA's story. It appears that unless 
FNMA was committing a fraud by means of the First Assignment, FNMA did not own the debt on the date of 
sale and therefore could not have made a credit bid, and therefore for a second reason FNMA lacks a valid 
trustee's deed and correspondingly lacks standing to assert a right to occupancy. 
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An Eviction Hearing Brief including all attachments was filed by Sundquist on June 
24, 2011. (R.PP33-62) (See Addendum). 
Following the hearing on June 27th, the Court ruled" I'm going to deny the motion at 
this point to, to vacate the eviction and I will sign an order of restitution, when you have it 
prepared," see Transcript pg 11, lines 2-4 (even though there was no "motion to vacate the 
eviction") and he issued Minutes of the Eviction Hearing. Judge Lubeck signed an Order of 
Restitution even though he had not heard the matter, and he did so without any findings of 
fact or conclusions of law. (R.PP63) (See Addendum) 
A Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order with attachments was filed on 
June 30, 2011. (R.PP64-88), and a Notice of Appeal was filed by Sundquist on June 30, 
2011. (R.PP89-90). This Court stayed the Order of Restitution pending the interlocutory 
appeal. (R. PI 13). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is a very simple case if the Court follows the very simple and plain 
language of the law that the legislature has established as to whom it has granted 
statutory permission to conduct non-judicial foreclosures, and if it follows the 
Supreme Court's admonition to the courts of this state to closely examine what 
has happened in this case. 
"The Supreme Court explained [in Blodgett v. Martsch] that courts have a 
duty to closely examine trust deed foreclosures that are questioned because they 
are far simpler than mortgage foreclosures, which require the assistance of the 
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court." Five F, LLC v. Heritage Savings Bank, 2003 UT App 373, paragraph 14, 
81 p.3d 105. {CitingBlodgett v. Martsch, 590 p.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978)). 
I. Does FNMA have standing to evict Sundquist from her Home under Utah's 
unlawful detainer statutes, if FNMA's purported title to the property was received by 
means of an invalid trustee's deed from ReconTrust? 
Non-judicial foreclosure is a statutory remedy that may only be exercised in 
accordance with the statutes that create it inasmuch as the statutes reflect the legislative policy 
determinations as to how the statutory remedy it has created may be utilized. 
The Legislature is free to decide to whom it will grant permission to exercise the 
statutory "power of sale" it created, and indeed it has, by creating specific statutory 
qualifications for any person/entity to act as a foreclosing trustee. 
The Legislature is also free to declare that any person not so qualified is an 
"unauthorized person," who lacks any grant of statutory authority to exercise the "power of 
sale," and that any purported exercise of the "power of sale" by an "unauthorized person" 
results in an "unauthorized sale," as it has expressly declared. 
A. Was ReconTrust an "unauthorized person" when it conducted the foreclosure 
sale at issue in this case, thereby rendering the foreclosure sale it conducted 
"unauthorized"? 
The Utah Legislature has determined in its legislative wisdom that the only persons to 
whom it will grant the statutory "power of sale" are those who are either 1) an active member 
of the Utah State Bar, or 2) title insurance companies or agencies licensed in the state. 
No other group has been given the statutory "power of sale," as repeated by the 
Legislature several times in the statute, and as clearly indicated by the Legislature's recent 
enactment expressly defining any such unqualified person as an "unauthorized person" and 
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any sale they perform as an "unauthorized sale," and has even provided civil penalties for any 
"unauthorized person" who performs an "unauthorized sale." 
It is undisputed that ReconTrust is not qualified under the statute to be a foreclosing 
trustee since it is neither an attorney nor a title insurance company or agency, and therefore it 
lacks permission to exercise the statutory "power of sale" created in UCA 57-1-23 so as to 
grant a trustee's deed. 
B. Does an "unauthorized sale" conducted by an "unauthorized person" result in an 
"unauthorized trustee's deed" such that the purported sale of the property is null and 
void ab initio so that no transfer of any title to FNMA ever occured? 
Inasmuch as the only way to sell a property through a non-judicial foreclosure is for a 
a duly-qualified person to exercise the statutory "power of sale" by granting a trustee's deed 
to the purchaser, any purported trustee's deed granted by an "unauthorized" foreclosing 
trustee is null and void ab initio. 
Such a deed grants nothing. Therefore FNMA has no ownership interest. 
C. Absent an "authorized sale" of Sundquist's Home to FNMA does FNMA have 
standing to assert a "right of occupancy during the litigation's pendency" in order to 
dispossess Sundquist from her Home? 
Inasmuch as ReconTrust is an indisputably "unauthorized person" under the statute, 
and has conducted an "unauthorized sale," the purported trustee's deed, under which FNMA 
claims ownership of the Home, as a matter of law was null and void and therefore could not, 
and did not, convey any title in the Home to FNMA. 
As such, FNMA lacks standing to evict Sundquist from what is still her own Home. 
Consequently, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award FNMA occupancy 
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during the litigation's pendency, and therefore any order granting to FNMA any occupancy or 
possession of the Home was equally null and void ab initio. 
II. Did the trial court err in granting possession without first determining whether it 
had subject matter jurisdiction given the challenge to FNMA's standing to dispossess 
Sundquist 
The trial court should have resolved the question of standing by resolving the question 
of ownership before it ruled on the question of possession. 
The same lack of standing, derived from the lack of any ownership interest in the 
property at issue, that precludes standing to seek interim occupancy of Sundquist's Home, 
naturally also results in a lack of standing to even bring the unlawful detainer action since the 
unlawful detainer statute is only for "owners" to recover possession of their property. 
Therefore not only must the Order of Restitution be stricken for a lack of standing, 
FNMA's entire unlawful detainer action must necessarily be summarily denied on remand for 
a lack of standing, and on remand Sundquist must necessarily be declared the prevailing party 
on the unlawful detainer action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Does FNMA have standing to evict Sundquist from her Home under Utah's 
unlawful detainer statutes, if FNMA's purported title to the property was received by 
means of an invalid trustee's deed from ReconTrust? 
Non-judicial foreclosures are not a remedy recognized in common law. Until the Utah 
Legislature adopted its non-judicial foreclosure statutes in UCA §§ 57-1-19 to 36, non-
judicial foreclosures simply were not available in Utah. 
The statutory "power of sale," whereby a foreclosing trustee may "cause the trust 
property to be sold in the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27" is only found in 
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UCA § 57-1-23, and is a statutory power created and granted by the foreclosure statutes — and 
by no other means. 
Parties simply do not have the inherent right or power to come up with their own non-
statutory methods for conducting non-judicial foreclosures separate from the foreclosing 
statutes. All parties must therefore follow the rules established by the Legislature if they want 
to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure. 
The Legislature is free to dictate who may be authorized to exercise the statutory 
"power of sale" it created, and indeed it has, by creating specific qualifications for any 
person/entity to act as a foreclosing trustee which it has done in Section 57-1-21. These 
statutory qualifications have already withstood legal challenge and been declared to be 
permissible by the Tenth Circuit in Shurtleffv. Kliensmith, 571 F.3r 1033 (12009). 
The Legislature is also free to declare that any person not so qualified is an 
"unauthorized person" who lacks any statutory authority to exercise the "power of sale," and 
that any purported exercise of the "power of sale" by an "unauthorized person" results in an 
"unauthorized sale," as it has expressly declared by enactment of 
Senate Bill 261 just this year, which went into effect seven days before the purported 
foreclosure in this case. See Section 57-1-23.5. 
Senate Bill 261 is consistent with the previous limitations on who may conduct a non-
judicial foreclosure: 
"The trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-l-21(l)(a)(i) or (iv) is given the 
power of sale by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust property to be sold ..." 
UCA 57-1-23 
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"The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by the trustee 
of a trust deed if the trustee is qualified under Subsection 57-1-21(1 )(a)(i) or (iv)." UCA 57-
1-21(3). 
"A trustee with an unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be effective to create a 
lien on the trust property, but the power of sale and other trustee powers under the trust deed 
may be exercised only if the beneficiary has appointed a qualified successor trustee under 
Section 57-1-22." UCA 57-1-21(4). 
"The power of sale conferred upon the trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-1-
21(l)(a)(i) or (iv) may not be exercised until ..." UCA 57-1-24. 
As the legislature has made perfectly clear by the forgoing provisions, it has only 
granted the statutory "power of sale" to those who are qualified under Subsection 57-1-
21(l)(a)(i)or(iv). 
If this Court were to allow anyone one who was not qualified under Subsection 57-1-
21(l)(a)(i) or (iv) to exercise the "power of sale," this Court would be impermissibly 
rewriting the statute to remove the statutory qualifications and all of the forgoing unequivocal 
declarations. 
We therefore address ourselves to [the statutes'] meaning, keeping in mind one of the 
cardinal rules of statutory constructions, viz., that the interpretation must be based on 
the language used, and that the court has no power to rewrite a statute to make it 
conform to an intention not expressed. 
The legislative intent being plainly expressed, so that the act read by itself, or in 
connection with other statutes pertaining to the same subject, is clear, certain and 
unambiguous, the courts have only the simple and obvious duty to enforce the law 
according to its terms. If a legislative enactment violates no constitutional provision 
or principle, it must be deemed its own sufficient and conclusive evidence of the 
justice, propriety and policy of its passage." 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Commission etaL, 155 P.2d 
184 (Utah 
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A. Was ReconTrust an "unauthorized person" when it conducted the foreclosure 
sale at issue in this case, thereby rendering the foreclosure sale it conducted 
"unauthorized"? 
The Utah Legislature has determined in its legislative wisdom that the only persons 
who may exercise the statutory "power of sale" are those who are either 1) an active member 
of the Utah State Bar, maintaining a bona fide office in the State where trustors may meet 
with the trustee, make payments, etc., or 2) title insurance companies or agencies licensed in 
the state, maintaining a bona fide office in the State where trustors may meet with the trustee, 
make payments, etc. See Subsection 57-1-21(1 )(a)(i) or (iv) and (l)(b). 
When determining whether a statutory provision is mandatory and jurisdictional, 'the 
most fundamental [guideline] is that the court should give effect to the intention of the 
legislature.' Sjostrom v. Bishop, 15 Utah 2d 373, 393 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah 1964). 
Determining the intention of the legislature 'requires us to consider what the figurative 
"legislative mind" would have intended had it adverted to the particular circumstances 
we are confronted with for adjudication.' Id" 
ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C, 2010 UT 65, 245 P.3d 1184, ]fl7. 
The statutory qualifications to be a foreclosing trustee, (as compared to a mere 
trustee),4 are clearly mandatory. No other person is granted the statutory permission to 
exercise the statutory "power of sale." See UCA sections 57-1-21(3) and (4), 57-1-23, 57-1-
23.5,57-1-24. 
As the Legislature recently made its 'legislative mind" perfectly clear for one and all: 
"As used in this section: (a) "Unauthorized person" means a person who does not qualify as a 
trustee under Subsection 57-1-21(1 )(a)(i) or (iv). (b) "Unauthorized sale" means the exercise 
of a power of sale by an unauthorized person." UCA 57-1-23.5(1). 
While there are six classes of persons/entities which may serve as a trustee under a trust deed, only two of those 
classes are granted the statutory authority to serve as foreclosing trustees with the authority to exercise the 
"power of sale." If any of the other classes are serving as trustee, they must be substituted out by the statutory 
beneficiary if the statutory beneficiary wishes to foreclose. See UCA 57-1-21(4). 
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It is undisputed that ReconTrust is not an attorney, and is not a title insurance 
company or agency. It is a subdivision of Bank of America, NA. 
If the legislature were to consider the undisputed facts before this Court, as supposed 
by ASC, it would unequivocally declare that ReconTrust is not "qualified" under the statute to 
be a foreclosing trustee, and therefore it has not been granted the statutory "power of sale" 
created in UCA 57-1-23 so as to allow it to convey title to FNMA by means of a trustee's 
deed under Section 57-1-28(3). Indeed, the motivation behind Senate Bill 261 was to stop 
ReconTrust from continuing to illegally foreclose on homes in Utah by clarifying that what it 
was doing was illegal and providing a financial incentive for private counsel to assist 
homeowners in fighting ReconTrust's unlawful foreclosures. 
Since it is undisputed that ReconTrust does not qualify under Subsection 57-1-
21(1 )(a)(i) or (iv) for a grant of statutory authority to exercise the "power of sale," it is 
undisputed that it was an "unauthorized person." 
And since it is undisputed that ReconTrust as an "unauthorized person" exercised the 
"power of sale" when it purportedly sold Sundquist's Home, it is necessarily undisputed that 
it conducted an "unauthorized sale." 
The Legislature could not have been any clearer that the sale at issue in this case was 
not authorized under the non-judicial foreclosure statutes if this specific case were presented 
to it today for another vote. 
B. Does an "unauthorized sale" conducted by an "unauthorized person" result in an 
"unauthorized trustee's deed" such that the purported sale of the property is null and 
void ab initio so that no transfer of any title to FNMA ever occured? 
If a stranger without any authority walked into the Recorder's office and recorded a 
Substitution of Trustee naming himself as the new successor trustee under the Court's own 
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trust deed, and then recorded a notice of default and election to sell against the Court's home, 
and then subsequently published a notice of sale after waiting the requisite 3 months, and then 
conducted a sale proper in every respect, selling the property for cash, and finally even 
delivered a trustee's deed to the buyer, with all the recitations as to compliance with the 
procedural requirements, such that every step is perfectly performed in accordance with the 
statutes, that buyer would still not own the Court's home. The trustee's deed would be 
worthless - because the stranger had no authority to act as trustee. He is a mere interloper. 
ReconTrust's lack of statutory authority to act as a foreclosing trustee renders any 
trustee's deed it conveys equally worthless. Its acts are the acts of a mere interloper, 
As the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted in both Bevilacqua and Ibanez: "[W]here 
a foreclosure sale occurs in the absence of authority, 'there is no valid execution of the power 
and the sale is wholly void.' 'One of the terms of the power of sale that must be strictly 
adhered to is the restriction on who is entitled to foreclose.' ... 'U.S. Bank's lack of authority 
to foreclose at the time it purported to foreclose - is fatal to Bevilacqua's claim to own the 
property.'" Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 2011 Mass. Lexis 918, pg 9, quoting U.S. Bank v 
Ibanez at 941 N.E. 2d, 41 (see addendum). 
Inasmuch as the only lawful way to sell a property through a non-judicial foreclosure 
in Utah is for a duly-qualified trustee to exercise the statutory "power of sale" to grant a 
trustee's deed to the purchaser, any purported trustee's deed granted by an "unauthorized" 
foreclosing trustee is a nullity, and is void ab initio. 
It is axiomatic that a deed grants nothing if the grantor has nothing to grant. See e.g., 
Holmes Development v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 48 P.3d 895 t (grantor did not validly convey the 
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property because grantor never held title to the parcel because of erroneous quitclaim deed in 
its chain of title that was supposed to convey title to grantor but did not.) 
As an unqualified trustee, ReconTrust had no trustee's title to convey. 
If the grantor has nothing to convey, then the deed is a nullity and void. It is of no 
value, and anyone taking subsequent "title" in that same chain of title likewise acquires 
nothing. 
A similar question was recently decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 2011 Mass. LEXIS 918 (decided October 18, 
2011). (See Addendum) 
In Bevilacqua, the plaintiff had received a quit claim deed for a property which had 
been improperly foreclosed because the foreclosing bank conducted the foreclosure sale 
before receiving assignment of the mortgage. He tried to bring a "try title" action to remove 
the cloud on the title. The trial court dismissed the case due to a lack of standing that denied 
the court subject matter jurisdiction. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. 
The plaintiff attempted to argue that "a single recorded deed purporting to transfer 
title is sufficient to establish record title." Id at pg 8. The trial court had noted that such a 
theory would allow someone to record title to the Brooklyn Bridge, commence suit and hope 
for a default, and thereby become the owner of the Bridge. The Massachusetts Supreme 
Court also naturally rejected the "single deed" theory: 
for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that there is nothing magical 
in the act of recording an instrument with the registry that invests an otherwise 
meaningless document with legal effect. ... Recording is not sufficient in and of itself, 
however to render an invalid document legally significant. ... As a result, it is the 
effectiveness of a document that is controlling rather than its mere existence. ... The 
effectiveness of the quitclaim deed to Bevilacqua thus turns in part on the validity of 
his grantor's title. 
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Id at pg 9 (citations omitted). 
The plaintiff then tried to argue that there was a sufficient chain of deeds recorded at 
the registry, but this argument was also rejected because of the invalid foreclosure deed in his 
chain. As the Court noted: "where a foreclosure sale occurs in the absence of authority, 
'there is no valid execution of the power and the sale is wholly void.' ... One of the terms 
of the power of sale that must be strictly adhered to is the restriction on who is entitled to 
foreclose.'" Id. quotingIbanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass 201 l)(emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Utah, the Court of Appeals in Davis v. Young, 2008 UT App 246, 190 
P.3d 23, f 19, held that the person who executed a quitclaim deed was "bound to follow" the 
method for revoking the trust when a quitclaim deed was executed, and his failure to do so 
required the setting aside of the quitclaim deed "as void ab initio." Because the prescribed 
method was not followed, the purported deed was worthless. 
Likewise in Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, 999 P.2d 1244, \ 5-6, the Court of 
Appeals rejected the defendants' arguments that a notice of claim was properly filed against 
the plaintiffs property and held that a lien placed upon the plaintiffs property was not 
authorized by statute, and therefore the trial court was correct in declaring it "void ab initio." 
"A thing is void which is done against the law at the very time of doing it,..." Ockey 
v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51, fii7. "In general, the difference between void and 
voidable contracts is whether they offend public policy. ... [Contracts that offend public 
policy or harm the public are void ab initio." Id at [^19. "A contract is void ab inito if it 
seriously offends law or public policy, in contrast to a contract that is merely voidable at the 
election of one party to the contract." Id fill 1 (quoting Black's Law Disctionary 1604 (8 
ed.2004)). 
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The public policy as to whether a trustee that is not qualified under Section 57-1-
21(l)(a)(i) or (iv) may convey a trustee's deed, a statutory remedy, has been unequivocally 
established by the legislature: and the answer is no. Subsection 57-1-21(4) expressly provides 
that the "power of sale" and the other trustee powers under a trust deed may only be exercised 
"if the beneficiary has appointed a qualified successor trustee under Section 57-1-22." 
Foreclosure sales by "unauthorized persons" are "unauthorized." See Section 57-1-
23.5, and therefore are against public policy. 
There is no doubt the ReconTrust trustee's deed at issue in this case was "against the 
law" when it was made, and therefore it is void ab inito. 
Being void ab initio, the ReconTrust trustee's deed to FNMA did not convey any 
interest in the property to FNMA. FNMA therefore does not own any interest in Sundquist's 
Home. 
C. Absent an "authorized sale" of Sundquist's Home to FNMA does FNMA have 
standing to assert a "right of occupancy during the litigation's pendency" in order to 
dispossess Sundquist from her Home? 
FNMA lacks any ownership in the Home that would entitle it to have standing to 
assert any right to occupancy under the unlawful detainer statute. Absent ownership, FNMA 
obviously lacks standing under the unlawful detainer statues to evict Sundquist from what is 
still legally her own Home. 
The problem is that the trial court jumped the gun and awarded possession by issuing 
the Order of Restitution5 before deciding whether FNMA actually owned the property, by 
simply accepting that since FNMA claimed to own the property it must own the property. In 
5
 In should be noted that while the legislature has given sever instances where an Order of Restitution may be 
awarded in an unlawful detainer action, it has not granted the trial court authority to issue an Order of Restitution 
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other words, the trial court did not determine ownership by the third party appearing before it, 
it merely assumed it. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has observed, "the unlawful detainer statute applies only 
in cases where an owner of property is unlawfully deprived of possession." Osguthorpe v. 
Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, 232 P.3d 999124 (emphasis added). 
The unlawful detainer statute defines "owner" as "the actual owner of the premises." 
UCA 78B-6-801 (5). Consequently, the unlawful detainer statute may only be invoked by 
"actual owners" of the property, not merely plaintiffs who claim to be owners. 
When ownership is contested, until the question of whether a plaintiff "actually owns" 
the property at issue is heard and finally resolved, the plaintiff does not have standing to seek 
the remedies afforded under the unlawful detainer statute. 
A trial court cannot grant occupancy during the litigation's pendency, as allowed 
under Section 87B-6-801(2), if "ownership" is in dispute because if "ownership" is still in 
dispute the plaintiff cannot possibly prove a "right of occupancy" at that time because 
ownership is yet to be decided. 
As noted by the Supreme Court in Osguthorpe, "The unlawful detainer statute is not 
the appropriate vehicle for litigating disputes over non-possessory interests in property, such 
as disputes over the scope of a license or easement." Osguthorpe at ^ 24. 
Sundquist asserts that an unlawful detainer action is also not the appropriate 
mechanism to litigate disputes as to ownership. 
If "ownership" is contested at the time of an "immediate occupancy hearing," then 
standing, and a "right" to occupancy, cannot be finally established by the plaintiff who has the 
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burden to establish its "right" to possession in spite of any challenge since it is plaintiff that is 
asking the court to change the status quo. 
If ownership is contested, the court cannot proceed to take any action under Section 
810(2) to deprive an owner of his or her home in only ten days after he or she files an answer, 
often after having only three days to answer after being served a copy of the complaint, and 
before any discovery has been done, even before any initial disclosures have been delivered 
revealing the basis for plaintiffs claim to ownership, etc., without denying the defendant his 
or her due process. 
Since plaintiffs in unlawful detainer actions following a forced sale are often strangers 
to the original transactions, and since there typically is absolutely no public record to show 
that the plaintiff was in fact the statutory beneficiary as defined by Section 57-1-19(1) ("the 
person for whose benefit a trust deed is given" and the successive owners of the debt), trial 
courts actually rarely have any proof at all before them at an "immediate occupancy hearing" 
that the foreclosure being asserted was in fact lawfully initiated by the true statutory 
beneficiary. (In fact, given the rampant use of loan servicers, who do not own the debt and 
therefore are not the statutory beneficiaries, to initiate foreclosures in violation of the plain 
language mandate by the legislature that statutory beneficiaries must "execute and 
acknowledge" substitutions of trustee in order to ensure that the foreclosure is being pursued 
by the proper party, the true identity of the statutory beneficiary, or "investor" as the term is 
often used in the industry, is frequently never even discovered.6) Trial courts are merely 
assuming that the foreclosures are valid, even when they are challenged, and are summarily 
evicting people based on that assumption before the question of ownership is decided. 
6
 It's not uncommon for loan servicers to refuse to tell a home owner who the actual "investor" or true owner of 
their debt is. 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This is hardly due process, and the systematic mass denial of due process that is 
currently occurring in the Utah judicial system needs to be halted by reinforcing that even 
debtors have rights, including the right to be heard after a reasonable opportunity to prepare 
their case, not 13 days, or fewer, after being served a complaint. 
And in the case of unlawful detainers, they have the statutory right of possession until 
"actual ownership" is finally proven, because until "actual ownership" is established (versus 
merely alleged in a complaint) the trial court cannot logically find a "right to occupancy" 
during the litigation's pendency. Obviously only the "actual owner" can claim a right to 
occupancy during the pendency of litigation of other matters unrelated to ownership and the 
right of possession. 
Otherwise, people will be denied possession of their homes with no meaningful 
remedy if they ultimately prevail on their defenses or counterclaims challenging the 
lawfulness of the foreclosure since the courts cannot put them back in their homes 
retroactively at the end of the case.7 
Indeed the sad reality is that many with legitimate challenges to unlawful foreclosures, 
such as those homeowners evicted based upon invalid trustee's deeds unlawfully issued by 
ReconTrust, give up once they are evicted from their homes because they cannot afford to 
keep fighting. 
Whereas if the defendants due process rights were being honored, even if they are in 
default, and the statute were actually followed, and their claims and challenges to the 
7
 Transferring possession prior to a final ruling on the question of ownership also carries the risk that the plaintiff 
may view the interim ruling as the green light to sell the property before the end of the case, in which case the 
defendants may never get their property back. 
8
 One of the sad realities is that many "defaults" are induced by the loan servicers telling homeowners seeking a 
loan modification that they cannot even be considered for a modification unless they default for at least two 
months, with the representation that those missed payments can be placed at the end of the loan. Then the 
homeowners are often put on trial payments that are reduced, which further increases the amount of the default, 
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plaintiffs claims to ownership were being heard before they are evicted, they could remain in 
their homes, as anticipated and allowed by the legislature,9 until the question of ownership, 
and the corresponding question of possession, are heard and finally resolved. 
II. Did the trial court err in granting possession without first determining whether it 
had subject matter jurisdiction given the challenge to FNMA's standing to dispossess 
Sundquist 
The present practice of the trial courts to merely assume ownership for purposes of an 
immediate occupancy hearing is inconsistent with the approach discussed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Bichler v. DEI Systems, Inc., 2009 UT 63, 220 P.3d 1203, where the Court 
addressed the interplay between unlawful detainer claims and counterclaims or defenses that 
affect the right to possession being claimed under the unlawful detainer statute. 
The Supreme Court noted that counterclaims are perfectly acceptable in unlawful 
detainer cases and recognized that some defenses and counterclaims may "directly relate to 
the issue of possession," id. at % 29, and that such counterclaims must be resolved before a 
final determination of possession may be made, and that final determinations of possession 
should be made in accordance with Rule 54(b) which requires all related claims and 
counterclaims involving the question of possession to be resolved before a "final judgment" 
on the issue of possession can be entered. 
Recognizing the important public policy of providing a speedy resolution of 
the issue of possession, we hold that in an unlawful detainer action with multiple 
during which time the loan servicer diverts funds that are paid, and would otherwise be going to the owner of the 
debt, to itself as late fees etc., thereby increasing the "default" even more. All while the homeowner thinks they 
are doing the right thing until suddenly they are denied a loan modification, even after paying all of the trial 
payments, leaving them thousands and thousands of dollars in default with no prospect to recover. 
9
 The legislature has already provided the mechanism whereby a plaintiff may obtain possession of the premises 
prior to the final determination of ownership, and that is by posting a possession bond under Section 808. That 
is the legislative remedy, but trial courts across the state are ignoring the legislative scheme and creating their 
own on the mistaken assumption they can hold an immediate occupancy hearing at any time, even though the 
legislature expressly limits such hearings to ten days after the filing of an answer, and turn over possession to the 
plaintiffs without a possession bond. Thereby adding insult to injury. 
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claims or counterclaims, a rule 54(b) entry of a final judgment resolving the issues of 
possession is proper when it includes all claims and counterclaims necessary to 
determine the lawful lawful possession of the property. 
Before directing the entry of a final judgment under Rule 54(b) on the issue of 
possession, the court must resolve all claims relating to possession. Our prior case law 
indicates that a counterclaim raising a breach of warranty of habitability must be 
addressed in determining lawful possession. Similarly, a claim of wrongful or 
retaliatory eviction would go to the issue of lawful possession. 
Id. at 1(30 and 32 (citations omitted).10 
Obviously the question of ownership of the property directly relates to the question of 
possession. Therefore, given the Supreme Court's holding in Bichler, the trial court must 
resolve all questions relating to ownership before it can rule on the right to the possession of 
the property. 
When the Supreme Court's ruling in Bichler is considered in light of the Court's 
observation that unlawful detainer actions are only for "owners," which the statute defines as 
actual owners, a plaintiff does not have standing to seek occupancy under Section 810(2) if 
ownership is disputed, such as when the legality of the foreclosure is disputed, as in this case. 
u[I]n Utah, ... standing is a jurisdictional requirement." A challenge to a 
party's standing "raise[es] fundamental questions regarding a court's basic authority 
over the dispute." As such, a challenge to standing is generally directed at a plaintiff 
and questions whether the plaintiff meets the jurisdictional requirement to air a 
particular grievance in court. 
Osguthorpe, 2010 UT 29, ]f 14 (citations omitted). 
FNMA's lack of standing to assert a right to occupancy is a subject matter jurisdiction 
defect. Consequently, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award FNMA 
10
 The Supreme Court then considered DEI's claim for an offset for damages it suffered under the alleged 
counterclaims unrelated to the lease, and even acknowledged that such claims for financial offsets could require 
resolution before the resolution of the issue of possession since such offsets could possibly be applied to rents 
such that a default might not even exist, which would preclude a claim for possession. 
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possession or occupancy under any theory, and therefore any order granting to FNMA any 
occupancy or possession of the Home was equally null and void ab initio. 
Once the issue of standing was raised, and the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction 
to hear and grant an unlawful detainer action was thereby challenged, the trial court should 
have resolved the question of its jurisdiction to even entertain the unlawful detainer action by 
resolving the question of ownership before proceeding any further with the unlawful detainer 
action's Section 810(2) hearing. 
"If a court acts beyond its authority those acts are null and void. Therefore the initial 
inquiry of any court should always be to determine whether the requested action is 
within its jurisdiction. When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the 
authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 
App. 1989)(citing Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987)(emphasis 
added)) 
UA court must have subject matter jurisdiction to have the power and authority to 
decide a controversy. Without subject matter jurisdiction a court cannot proceed. See 
Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1276 n.3 (Utah App. 1990)." Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. 
Allstate, 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1993)(emphasis added). 
"Because it is a threshold issue, we address jurisdictional questions before resolving 
other claims." Housing Authority of the County of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 44 P.3d 724, f 11 
(Utah 2002)(emphasis added). 
[SJubject matter jurisdiction goes to the very power of a court to entertain an 
action. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor 
cured by a waiver. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any 
time and when subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor 
the court can do anything to fill that void. 
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Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990)(emphasis added), see also Thompson v. 
Jackson, 1A3 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987)("subject matter jurisdiction cannot be 
created or conferred on the court by consent or waiver")(citing Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc. 694 
P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984); State Dept. Social Servs. V. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982); Basso 
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1974)). 
"[I]f jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to 
the one against whom it runs." State, v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)(vacating a 
"default" judgment based upon a Rule 60(b) motion). 
"Subject Matter Jurisdiction is the authority and the competency of the court to decide 
the case. Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, is the court's ability to exercise its power 
over a person for the purposes of adjudicating his or her rights and liabilities. A lack of either 
is fatal to a court's authority to decide a case with respect to a particular litigant." Fiji I at 
1132 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the trial court lacked the competency to decide the right to occupancy 
because ownership is disputed. 
The general rule in effect for many years as explained by United States 
Supreme Court Justice William B. Woods in United States v. Walker, 109 U.S. 
258, 3 S. Ct. 277, 27 L. Ed. 927 (1883). is this, "Although a court may have 
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter, yet if it makes a decree 
which is not within the powers granted to it by the law of its organization its 
decree is void." Id. at 266. And again in Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co., 254 U.S. 348. 41 S. Ct 116, 65 L. Ed. 297 (1920), writing for the Court, 
Justice Joseph McKenna recognized, "Courts are constituted by authority and 
they cannot go beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that 
authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are 
regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even 
prior to reversal." Id. at 353-354. 
In re Andrews, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3333 (N.D.Bank. AL 2007)(unpublished)(citing 
Stockyards Nat. Bank of So. Omaha v. Bragg, 245 P. 966, 973 (Utah 1925)). 
It is a familiar doctrine that though a court may have jurisdiction of subject-
matter and of person and thus power to hear and determine, still in a cause may 
act, or make an order, or render judgment, beyond or in excess of jurisdiction -
do something which it had no power to do. ... A fact apparent from the 
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mandatory record, showing that fundamental law was disregarded in the 
establishment of the judgment will render it null and void for all purposes. 
Stockyards Nat. Bank of So. Omaha v. Bragg, 245 P. 966, 973 (Utah 1925)(emphasis added). 
Consequently, once the question of ownership arose, the trial court necessarily should 
have terminated the Section 810(2) hearing, and reserved the question of possession until after 
the court could fully hear and decide the question of ownership in accordance with Bichler. 
Only if the court finally concluded that the plaintiff is the "actual owner" of the property 
could it then proceed with the unlawful detainer action so as to rule upon possession, and 
enter a Rule 54(b) final judgment as to who is entitled to possession during the remainder of 
the litigation. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
If the court concludes that FNMA lacks ownership of the Home as argued, then the 
unlawful detainer action is substantively concluded, and Sundquist is the prevailing party. 
Sundquist is entitled to an award of her reasonable attorneys' fees in this case inasmuch as she 
is . 
Sundquist respectfully requests that this honorable court award the reasonable costs 
and attorneys fees incurred as a private attorney general in bringing this interlocutory appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 
recognized a party's right to recover attorneys' fees as a private attorney general when the 
"vindication of a strong or societally important public policy" takes place and the necessary 
costs in doing so "transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring 
subsidization." Stewart v. Utah Public Service Com % 855 P.2d 759, 783 (Utah 1994) citing 
with approval Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25 (1977). 
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In the instant matter, Sundquist has challenged a violation of Utah's non-judicial 
foreclosure statutes with broad public policy and societal implications. Utah's Attorney 
General previously opined in favor of the Sundquist's position, but Sundquist is bearing the 
burden of enforcing the law not just for herself, but for all similarly situated victims of 
ReconTrust's misconduct, which FNMA has been the knowing beneficiary thereof. 
Accordingly, in light of the broad impact an award a favorable ruling will have upon the 
foreclosure crisis in the State of Utah, Appellant's effort should be subsidized with an award 
of attorneys' fees and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Sundquist respectfully requests that the Court rule that the ReconTrust Trustee's Deed 
was null and void ab initio for having been granted by an "unauthorized person" in 
conjunction with an "unauthorized sale," and therefore FNMA lacks any ownership interest in 
the Home. 
Further it is requested that the Court hold that given the lack of a valid ownership 
interest in the Home FNMA lacked standing to bring an unlawful detainer action, and in 
particular that the trial court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a Section 
810(2) hearing when the ownership was contested, and that the trial court could not have 
ruled on the question of possession until all defenses and counterclaims concerning the 
question of ownership were finally resolved since the question of ownership is directly related 
and inseparable from the question of ownership. 
In order to facilitate and promote justice, it is further requested that the Court clarify 
that neither court clerks nor judges may automatically schedule Section 810(2) "immediate 
occupancy hearings" as occurred in this case inasmuch as the responsibility for requesting 
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I 
such hearings is the responsibility of the parties, and if a party does not request such a 
hearing, it is waived, as would be appropriate in cases where ownership is disputed. Then the 
legislative remedy and protection of a possession bond may be sought if desired. 
It is therefore requested that the Court vacate the Order of Restitution that was 
improperly entered and remand this case with instructions to the trial court to rule that 
FNMA's unlawful detainer action is denied due to the lack of any ownership interest as a 
matter of law, and that Sundquest is the prevailing party and therefore is entitled to her 
reasonable attorney fees under UCA 78B-6-811(3), to be determined on remand to include 
fees incurred in bringing this interlocutory appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of November 2011 
attorneys forOefendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief was served upon the following counsel or parties by placing a copy of the same in the 
U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on this the 3rd day of November, 2011 : 
Brigham J. Lundberg, Esq. 
Lundberg & Associates 
3269 South Main #100 
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RECORDING REQUESTED BY: 
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL DOCUMENT 
TAX STATEMENT TO: 
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE 
ASSOCIATION, 400 National way, SIMI VALLEY, 
CA 93065 
05/25/2011 03J20 PM * i - 4 - O O 
Book - 9926 Ps - 6533-6535 
GARS' h i . O T T 
RECORDER, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
8ACKMAH TITLE SERVICES 
167 E 6100 S 
SLC UT 84107 
BY: J C R , DEPUTY - til 3 P. 
TS#: 09-0052070 
TSG# 5-049845 
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TRUSTEE'S DEED 
This Deed is made by RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., as successor Trustee under the hereinafter 
described Trust Deed, in favor of FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, 400 National 
way, SIM] VALLEY, CA 93065, as Grantee. 
WHEREAS, on May 2, 2006, LORAINE SUNDQUIST, as Trustor, executed and delivered to 
STEWART T. MATHESON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, as Trustee, for the benefit of MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., as Beneficiary, a certain Trust Deed to secure the 
performance by said Trustor of the obligations under a Promissory Note. The Trust Deed was recorded in 
the office of the Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on May 8, 2006, as Instrument No. 
9716816, in Book 9291, Page 2006, and covered the property described below; and 
WHEREAS, breach and default was made under the terms of the Trust Deed in the particulars set 
forth in the Notice of Default referred to below; and 
WHEREAS, RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., was appointed by the Beneficiary as successor 
Trustee by a Substitution of Trustee recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on April 28, 2009, as Instrument No. 10686248, in book 9742 page 5730; and 
WHEREAS, RECONTRUST COMPANY, N A , executed and filed for record in the Office of 
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, a written Notice of Default containing an election to sell the 
trust property, which Notice of Default was recorded on/April 28, 2009, as Instrument No. 10686249, in 
book 9715 page 5732; and 
WHEREAS RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., the successor Trustee in consequence of the declaration 
of default, election and demand for sale, and in accordance with said Trust Deed, executed the Notice of 
Trustee's Sale stating that it would sell at public auction to the highest bidder the property therein and 
hereafter'described, and fixing the time and place of said sale as May 17, 2011, at 10:30 AM, of said day, 
and did cause copies of said notice to be posted for not less than 20 days before the date of sale therein 
fixed, at the office of the county recorder in the county wherein said property is located, and also in a 
conspicuous place on the property to be sold; and said successor Trustee did cause a copy of the notice to 
be "published once a week for three consecutive weeks before the date of sale in the INTERMOUNTAIN 
COMMERCIAL RECORD; and 
Tax ID: 28-33-127-008 Page I of2 UTTrstDeed.doc (J 2/08) 
BK 9926 PCS R&tt 
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WHEREAS, all applicable statutory provisions of the State of Utah and all of the provisions of 
said Trust DtQd have been complied with as to the acts to be performed and the notices to be given; and 
WHEREAS, the successor Trustee did, at the time and place of sale, then and there sell, at public 
auction, to Grantee above named, being the highest bidder therefor, the property described for the sum of 
SI 5] ,320.90. 
• NOW, THEREFORE, RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., successor Trustee, in consideration of 
the premises recited and of the sum above mentioned, bid and paid by Grantee, the receipt whereof is 
hereby acknowledged, and by virtue of the authority in it by said Trust Deed, grants and conveys unto 
Grantee above named, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied, all of that certain 
property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, described as follows: 
,mSEE ATTACHED LEGAL"1' 
Dated: May 18,2011 
STATE OF _ 
COUNTY OF 
Texas 
By: REmNTRUST COMPANY, N.A. 
3KM~^ & It'll 
Authorized Signer 
Tarrant 
QnM^n &hd if before me Kamra B, Walker personally appeared 
&rth« Sgn known to me (or proved to me on the oath of _ 
Lanetia Jones 
or through 
^L J to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and 
acknowledged to me that h$she executed the same for the purposes and consideration therein expressed. 
W/iT J^E^S Mjf HAND ANft OFFICIAL SEAL 
Notary Public's Signature 
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Beginning at a point 3368,45 feet West and 372,00 feet South from the Northeast corner of Section 
33, Township 3 South, Range 1 East* Salt Lake Base and Meridian* and running thence North 
129.00 feet; thence East 8$ feet, more or less, to tbe center of canal; thence Southeasterly along the 
center of said canal to a point due East of beginning; thence West to the point of beginning. 
Parcel 1A: 
Right of Way; 
Commencing at a point in the center of a 5D foot road and center of canal; west 3191.45 feet and 
South 512 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 33, Town3b!p 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Ba$# and Meridian, and running thence West 177 feet along center of road; thence North 140 feet; 
thence due East to center ofcanai and mnning thence Sonth 6 degrees 30* East along center of 
canal tbe place of beginning. 
Less and excepting therefrom any portion contained within the Draper Irrigation Rsght-of-Way, 
Subject to current general taxes, easements, restrictions* reserraf Ions and right-of-ways appearing 
of record. 
Qtf QQOC D ^ £>COC 
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J. Kent Holland #1520 
J KENT HOLLAND, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 902278 
Sandy, Utah 84090-2278 
Telephone: (801) 738-3181 
jkhollandla w@yahoo. com 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 




LORAINE SUNDQUIST and JOHN 
DOE/JANE DOE/OCCUPANT 
DOUG KAHLER, an individual 
Defendant. 
EVICTION HEARING BRIEF 
Civil No: 110408730 EV 
Judge Kouris 
FACTS 
Defendant Loraine Sundquist, hereinafter referred to as 
"Sundquist", has been a resident of 1599 East 12700 South, 
Draper, Utah since 1996. 
On or about 2006 Sundquist contacted American Elite Mortgage to 
obtain a new "mortgage" on her property. 
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3. Sundquist was advised at the time of closing, the paper had been 
transferred to Countywide. However, at that time, Sundquist 
executed a Trust Deed to Stewart T. Matheson, Attorney at Law, as 
Trustee, for the benefit of Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc., as Beneficiary. 
4. In 2008, after learning Countrywide was no longer an operating 
busmess entity, Sundquist contacted her original loan officer at 
•American Elite Mortgage and he advised her to contact Bank of 
America, hereinafter referred to as "BAC" to verify if BAC was the 
correct servicing entity entitled to receive her payment. 
5. Between October 2008 and February 2009, Sundquist contacted 
BAC on multiple occasions, via telephone, requesting evidence of 
BAC as her loan servicing company, Sundquist was instead 
transferred to a loan modification specialist whom then indicated 
she may be eligible for a new loan or modification and would she 
like to make application. 
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6. Sundquist then submitted to BAC financial documentation to BAC 
for prequalification of a modification and/or new lower interest 
rate loan. 
7. In February 2009. BAC loan representative informed Sundquist she 
was not eligible for a loan nor a loan modification unless she was 
60 days in arrears. 
8. On or about March 2009 Sundquist, per BAC's representative's 
direction and implied promise to modify, Sundquist stopped loan 
payments to Countrywide Mortgage. 
9. Not hearing timely from BAC, Sundquist grew more anxious, but 
continued to contact BAC for the purpose obtaining either the 
status of the promised loan modification and to obtain the 
documentation showing the identity of the note holder and the 
^chain of transfer to that note holder to ensure payments were going 
to the right entity. 
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10. Finally, on December 17, 2010 BAC Home Loan Servicing (a 
subsidiary of Bank of America, NA) received Sundquist's written 
request for information regarding the identity of the beneficiary of 
her Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. See Exhibit"A ". 
11. In the same letter dated December 18, 2010 from BAC, Sundquist 
was told that her current investor/beneficiary of her Note and Trust 
Deed FNMA ACT\ACT, See Exhibit"A". 
12. Also, regarding her request for copies of the documents 
transferring ownership of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note, in 
BAC's Sundquist was told she was not entitled to copies of the 
requested documents, "Accordingly, we respectfully decline this 
request In lieu of providing you with the 
information/documentation you requested, we have enclosed 
herewith a certified true and correct copy of the NOTE". The Note 
sent was not Sundquist's Note as can be seen in the attached Note 
but a note for property located in Jacksonville, FL with Nakita 
Perinet and Taniger Perinet as Borrowers. See Exhibit "A ". 
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13. Sundquist, following the receipt of that letter with the wrong 
attached Note, made numerous telephonic requests to BAC for the 
requested documents including a copy of her note, with no 
response. 
14. Januaiy 2011, a NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE was placed on 
Sundquist door, for the purpose of foreclosing a trust deed in favor 
of MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, 
INC. as Beneficiary, and noticed the Trustee as RECONTRUST 
COMPANY, N.A., covering the Sundquist real property7. See 
Exhibit «B". 
15. On June 1, 2011. Sundquist had on her door posted a NOTICE TO 
QUIT from Lundberg & Associates, attorney for FNMA stating on 
May 17, 2011, at 10:30 am ReconTrust Company. N.A., Trustee, m 
favor of MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC., as nominee for American's Wholesale Lender 
and is successors and assigned had been sold to FNMA and FNMA 
has elected to terminated tenancy at will. See Exhibit "Cy\ 
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ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I: Is Reconstrust Company. N.A. a valid Trustee under Utah Code § 
§57-1-21(3) and 57-1-23 with the "Power of Sale" such that it may 
conduct foreclosures? 
The entity who gave Sundquist NOTICE OF TRUSTEE SALE was ReconTrust 
Company, N.A. See Exhibit "BJ\ ReconTrust Company, N.A. is neither an active 
member the Utah State Bar residing in the state of Utah where the property is located nor 
"any title insurance company or agency that: (A) holds a certificate of authority or 
license under Title 31A, Insurance Code, to conduct insurance business in the state;" § 
§57-1-21. It is clear that the subject matter foreclosure was not done in compliance with 
Utah Statutes and is hence illegal. See Exhibit "B'\ 
This point was specifically addressed by the Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, for 
the State of Utah, in a letter to Brian T. Moynihan, President of Bank of America, dated 
May 19,2011. "Utah Code § §57-1-21(3) and 57-1-23provide that the only valid 
trustees of trust deeds with the "power of sale" are those who are either members of 
Utah State Bar or title insurance companies. Since ReconTrust is neither of these, all 
real estate foreclosures conducted by ReconTrust in the State of Utah are not in 
compliance with Utah's statutes, and are hence illegal" See Exhibit "D". 
Therefore, if the foreclosure of Sundquist's property was not in conformance with 
Utah Code and further deemed illegal bv the Utah State Attorney General, the Trustee had 
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no authority to neither conduct the sale nor deed the Sundquist property7 to Federal 
National Mortgage Association. Hence, the Notice to Quit and the Eviction action by 
Plaintiff fails, Sundquist cannot under Utah law be evicted. 
ISSUE 2: is ReconTrust Company, N.A. exempt in exercising it fiduciary 
powers from the aforementioned Utah Statutes doe to the fact that it is a subdivision 
of BAC, a national bank? 
The NATIONAL BANK ACT which grants national banks the authority to act in 
a fiduciary capacity does not exempt the application of the applicable Utah Statutes. 12 
U.S.C. 92a(a) and (b) states "when not in contravention of State or local law". 
Therefore, ReconTrust Company, N.A. cannot rely on Federal statutes to allow it 
to act as a valid Trustee of Trust Deeds with power of sale in the State of Utah, Attorney 
General Shurtleff in his letter specifically said, ".. .the section of the National Bank Act 
granting national banks authority to act in a fiduciary capacity specifically states that 
such authority shall be exercised only 'when not in contravention of State or local 
lawV'12 U.S.C.92a(a) and (b). See Exhibit «&'. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, ReconTrust Company N.A, does not qualify under Utah statute as a 
Trustee with the power of sale. Further, regardless of the application of the Federal 
statute, it still must not be in contravention of Utah statutes, Therefore, the foreclosure by 
ReconTrust Company N.A, violated Utah statutes and is void. Since it is void, the 
Trustee has no authority to issue a Trustee's deed to Federal National Mortgage 
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Association (FNMA), the Plaintiff to this action. Hence FNMA has no standing or basis 
upon which it can evict Sundquist. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 2011. 
J. Kent Holland 
Attorney for the Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S 
Eviction Hearing Brief was mailed this 24th day of June 2011 to the following: 
Richard Gunnerson (USB No. 10862) 
Brad G. DeHann (USB No. 08168) 
Brigham Lundberg (USB No. 12583) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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Bank of America ^ | § ^ 
Home Loans 
~ ~ ~ ™
s
" ^ ^ . 400 National Way 
Mailstop CA6-919-02-22 
Simi Valley., CA 93065 
December 17,2010 
Loraine Sundquist 
1599 East 12700 South 
Draper, UT 84020 
Re: Borrower Name(s): Loraine Sundquist 
Property Address: 1599 East 12700 South. Draper, UT 84020 
Loan Number Ending in 94778 
Dear Ms, Sundquist: 
We are in receipt of your correspondence undated, which was received on November 18, 2010, by BAC 
Home Loans Servicing., LP (i4BAC Home Loans77), a subsidiary of Bank of America, N.A., regarding the 
referenced loan, 
You requested, information regarding the investor of this loan, which is as follows: 
FNMA ACT/ACT 
13150 World Gate Drive 
Herndon, VA 20170 
703-8334700 
Further, with respect to your request for the original NOTE, you cite no authority supporting your claim 
that you are entitled to the information/documentation you requested, and we are not aware of the 
existence of any such authority, Accordingly, we respectfully decline this request. In lieu of providing 
you with the information/documentation you requested, we have enclosed herewith a certified true and 
correct copy of the NOTE, 
If you have concerns or questions regarding the foreclosure, please contact BAC Home loans' FBRM 




Foreclosure, Bankruptcy, and Risk Management (FBRM) 
Qualified Written Request (QWR) Group 
Enclosure 
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Prepared by-; ASHLEY WHITESIDE 
LOAN #: 176653368 
NOTE 
AUGUST 0 3 , 2 0 0 7 F L O R I D A 
IDate] [City] (State) 
6 6 1 T R E E SWALLOW C O U R T , J A C K S O N V I L L E , FL 3 2 2 2 5 
[Property Address] 
1* B O R R O W E R ' S P R O M I S E T O P A Y 
In return for a loan that I have received, I promise to pay U .S , $ 3 3 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 (this amount is called "Principal"), 
plus interest, to the order of the Lender. The Lender is 
C O U N T R Y W I D E HOME L O A N S , I N C . 
I will make all payments tinder this Note in the form of cash, check or money order. 
I understand that the Lender may transfer this Note. The Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who is 
entitled to receive payments under this Note is called the "Note Holder," 
2, I N T E R E S T 
Interest will be charged on -unpaid principal until the full amount of Principal has been paid. I will pay interest at a yearly 
rate of 7 . 7 5 0 %. 
The interest rate- required by this Section 2 is the rate I will pay both before and after any default described in Section 6(B) 
of this Note . 
3* P A Y M E N T S 
(A) T i m e a n d P lace of Faymenis 
I will pay principal and interest by making a payment every month. 
1 will make my monthly payment on the F I R S T , day of each month beginning on 
S E P T E M B E R 0 2 , 2 0 0 7 . I will make these payments every month until I have paid all of the principal and interest 
and any other charges described below that I may owe under this Note. Each monthly payment will be applied as of its 
scheduled due date and will be applied to interest before Principal. If, on AUGUST 0 1 , 2 0 3 7 , 1 still owe amounts 
under this Note, I will pay those amounts in full on that date, which is called the "Maturity Date." 
I will make my monthly payments at 
P . O . B o x 6 6 0 6 9 4 / D a l l a s , TX 7 5 2 6 6 - 0 6 9 4 * ' - ' . 
or at a different place if required by the Note Holder, 
(B) A m o u n t of Month ly Payments 
My monthly payment will be in the amount of U . S . $ 2 , 3 6 4 . 1 6 
4, B O R R O W E R ' S R I G H T T O P R E P A Y 
I have the right to make payments of Principal at any time before they are due. A payment of Principal only is known as a 
"Prepayment,"' When I make a Prepayment, I will tell th& Note Holder in writing that I am doing so, I may not designate a 
p&ym&ni as a Prepayment if I have not made all the monthly payments due under the Note. 
I may make a full Prepayment or partial Prepayments without paying a Prepayment charge. The Note Holder will use my 
Prepayments to reduce the amount of Pnncipal that I owe under this Note. However, the Note Holder may apply my Prepayment 
to the accrued and unpaid interest on ih& Prepayment amount before applying my Prepayment to reduce the Principal amount of 
the Note, If I make a partial Prepayment, there will be no changes in the, due date or in the amount of my monthly payment 
unless the Note Holder agrees in writing to those changes. „ - * 
5, L O A N C H A R G E S 
If a law, which applies to this loan &nd which sets maximuxn.'loan charges, is finally interpreted so that the interest or other 
loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with this loan exceed the permitted limits, then: (a) any such loan charge 
shall be xeduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the permitted limit; and (b) any sums already collected from 
me which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to me. The Note Holder may choose to make this refund by reducing the 
Principal I owe under this Note or by making a direct payment to me. If a refund reduces Principal, the reduction will be treated 
as a partial Prepayment. 
6, B O R R O W E R ' S F A I L U R E T O P A T AS REQTJJLKED 
(A) L a t e C h a r g e for O v e r d u e Payments 
If the Note Holder has not received the full amount of any. monthly .payment by the end of F I F T E E N calendar 
days after the date it is due, I will pay a late charge to the Note Holder.-The amount of the charge will be 5 . 0 0 0 % of my 
overdue payment of principal and interest I will pay this late charge promptly but only once on each late payment. 
(B) Defau l t " , 
If I do not pay the full amount of each monthly payment on the date it is due, I will b e in default. 
FLORIDA FIXED RATE NOTE-Slngte Family-Fannfe fc/lae/Frecfrile Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT 
VMP MORTGAGE FORMS - (300)521 -7291 inHials 
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LOAN # : 1 7 6 6 5 9 3 6 8 
(C) Notice of Default 
If I am in default, the Note Holder may send me a written notice telling me that if I do not pay the overdue amount by a 
certain date, the Note Holder may require me to pay immediately jthe full amount of Principal which has not been paid and all 
the interest that I owe on that amount. That date must be at least 30 days after the date on which the notice is mailed to me or 
dslivGrod by other means. 
(D) No Waiver By Note Holder 
Even if, at a time when I am in default, the Note Holder does not require me to pay immediately in full as described 
above, the Note Holder will still have the right to do so if I am in default at a later time. 
•(E) Payment of Note Holder's Costs and Expenses 
If the Note Holder has required me to pay immediately in.full as described above, the Note Holder will have the right to be 
paid back by me for all of its costs and expenses in enforcing this -Note to tlje extent not prohibited by applicable law. Those 
expenses include, for example, reasonable attorneys' fees. 
7. GIVING-OF NOTICES 
Unless applicable law requires a different method, any notice that must be given to me under this Note will be given by 
delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail to me at the Propeny Address above or at a different address if I give the Note 
Holder a notice of my different address. 
Any notice that must be given to the Note Holder under this, Note will be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first 
class mail to the Note Holder at the address stated in Section 3(A) above or at a different address if I am given a notice of that 
different address. 
S, OBLIGATIONS' OF PERSONS UNDER THIS NOTE 
If more than one person signs this Note, each person is folly and personally obligated to keep all of the promises made in 
this Note, including the promise to pay the full amount owed. Any person who is a guarantor, surety or endorser of this Note is 
also obligated to do these things. Any person who takes over these obligations, including the obligations of a guarantor, surety 
or endorser of this Note, is also obligated to keep all of the promises made in this Note. The Note Holder may enforce its rights 
under this Note against each person individually or against all of us together. This means that any one of us may be required to 
pay all of the- amounts owed under this Note. 
9* WAIVERS 
I and any other person who has obligations under this Note waive the rights of Presentment and Notice of Dishonor, 
"Presentment" means the right to require the Note Holder to< demand payment of amounts due. "Notice of Dishonor" means the 
right to require the Note Holder to give, notice to other persons that .amounts due have not fosen paid, 
10, UNIFORM SECUKKD NOTE : 
This Note is a uniform instrument with limited variations in some jurisdictions. In addition to the protections given to the 
Note Holder under this Note, a Mortgage, Dood of Trust, or Security Deed Qh& "Security instrument"), dated the same date as 
this Note, protects the Note Holder from possible losses which might result if I do not keep the promises which I make in this 
Note. That-Security Instrument describes how and under what conditions I may be required to make immediate payment in full 
of all amounts 1 owe under this Note, Some of those conditions are ^escribed as follows:. 
If all or mry part of the Property or any Interest in the Property Is* sold or transferred (or if Borrower is not a 
natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without Lender's prior written consent, 
Lender may require immediate payment m full of all sums' secured by this Security Instrument. However, this 
option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by Applicable Law. 
If Lender exercises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide a 
period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice lsvgiven in accordance with Section i5 within which 
Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to the 
expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this Security Mstrurnent without further 
notice or demand on Borrower. 
11. DOCIJMENTAR1T TAX 
The state documentary tax due on this Note has been paid on the mortgage securing this indebtedness. 
WITNESS THE HAND(S) AND SEAL(S) OF THE. UNDERSIGNED, 
) 
, . , (Seal) ^ - — / ^ ^ ^ ' \ ^ ^ (Seal) 
MAKITA PERI MET -Soixower TANGIER FBRT&ST ) -Borrow er 
_ (Sealj . 1 \UrJ (Seal) 
-Borrowei: * -Bosxcwer 
[Sign Original Only] 
"ORIGINAL « 
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NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE 
The following described property will be sold at public auction to the highest bidder, payable in 
lawful money of the United States at the time of the sale, t;at the East Main Entrance (Rotunda) of the 
Scott M. Matheson Salt Lake County Courthouse, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah", on 
January 28; 2010. at 10:30 AM, of said day, for the purpose of foreclosing a trust deed dated May 2, 
2006 and executed by LORAINE SUNDQUIST, as Trustors) in favor of MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. as Beneficiaryr covering the following real property located in Salt 
Lake County: 
""SEE ATTACHED LEGAL"" 
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, 
appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property. 
Tax Parcel No.: 28-33-127-008 
The address of the property is purported to be 1599 EAST 12700 SOUTH, DRAPER, UT 84020-8316. 
The undersigned disclaims liability for any error in the address. The current Beneficiary of the trust deed 
is MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., and the record owners of the 
property as of the recording of the notice of default is reported to be LORAINE SUNDQUIST. 
Bidders must be prepared to tender to the trustee, RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., $5,000.00 at the 
sale and the balance of the purchase price by 12:00 noon the day following the sale and deliverable to: 
Matheson, Mortensen, et al, 648 East First South, Salt Lake City, UT 84102. Both payments must be in 
the form of a cashier's check or money order and made payable to RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., 
cash and Bank "Official Checks"' are not acceptable. A trustee's deed will be made available to the 
successful bidder within three business days following receipt of the bid amount. The sale is made 
without any warranty whatsoever, including but not limited to any warranty as to title, liens, possession, 
taxes, encumbrances, or condition of the property. The sale is subject to a workout reinstatement, payoff, 
sale cancellation or postponement, incorrect bidding instructions, bankruptcy, or any other circumstance 
of which the trustee is unaware. In the event any of the foregoing apply, the sale will be void and the 
successful bidder's funds will be returned without any liability to the trustee or beneficiary for interest or 
any other damages. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT RECONTRUST COMPANY, NA. IS ATTEMPTING TO 
COLLECT A DEBT AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT 
PURPOSE, AND THAT THE DEBT MAY BE .DISPUTED. 
Dated: December 18, 2009 
Gadalia Estremera-Caquias, Team Member 
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A. 
2380 Performance Dr, TX2-985-07-03 
Richardson, TX 75082 
(800)281-8219x3405 
Regular Business Hours: Monday - Friday, 
8:00a.m. to 5:00p.m., Central Time 
TS#: 09 -0052070 
Tax ID: 28-33-127-008 Paae 1 of 1 UTNOS (07*07) 
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NOTICE TO QUIT 
Loiaine Sundquist 
'-l#99€ast 12700 South /_; . / > / / -
Draper, UT 84020 ^ ' ' 
\ 
You are notified, pursuant to provisions of sections §78B~6-802.5 and §78B~6-802, Utah Code 
Annotated, that you are required to vacate the property located at 1599 East 12700 South, Draper, 
UT 84020, more particularly described as follows: 
1. Parcel 1 
Beginning at a point 3368.45 feet West and 372,00 feet South from the Northeast 
comer of Section 33, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence North 129.00 feet; thence East 86 feet, more or less, to 
the center of canal; thence Southeasterly along the center of said canal to a point due 
East of beginning; thence West to the point of beginning. 
Parcel 1A: 
Right of Way: 
Commencing at a point in the center of a 50 foot road and center of a canal; West 
3191.45 feet and South 512 feet from the Northeast comer of Section 33, Township 
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running ihence West 177 
feet along center of road: thence North 140 feet; thence due East to center of canal 
and running thence South 6°30? East along the center of canal the place of 
beginning. 
Less .and Excepting therefrom any portion contained within the Draper Irrigation 
Right-of-Way. 
Subject to current general taxes, easements, restrictions, reservations and right-of-
ways appearing of record. 
and surrender the possession thereof to Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA") within 
five (5) days after service of this notice upon you. 
On May 17,2011, at 10:30 a.m,? Recontrust Company, N A , Trustee under a Trust Deed dated May 
2, 2006, and executed by Loiaine Sundquist, as trustor, in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registraiton 
Systems, Inc. as nominee for America's Wholesale Lender, its successors and assigns, caused the 
above referenced property to be sold at a public sale. .At the sale, the property was sold to FNMA. 
From and since that time, you have been a tenant at will. FNMA has elected to terminate said 
tenancy. 
In the event that you fail to vacate the property within five (5) days from the date on which you 
receive this notice, you will be guilty of unlawful detainer as provided by sections §786-6-802.5 
and §78B-6~802, Utah Code Annotated, and appropriate legal action will be instituted against you 
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oil which you receive this notice, if you are not a bona fide tenant you will be guilty of unlawful 
detainer as provided by sections §78B-6-802.5 and §78B-6-802? Utah Code Annotated and 
appropriate legal action will be instituted against you for possession of the premises and for treble 
damages as provided for by section §78B-6-81L Utah Code Annotated. A bona fide tenant is 
defined as a renter or leasehold occupant paying fair market rental resulting from an arms length 
transaction. 
DATED this 2M day of May, 201L 
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES 
B^jua./^ € ^ rww 
Richard Gunnerson 
^ ^ B r a d G. DeHaan 
Brigham Lundberg 
Attorneys for FNMA 
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100 
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STATE OF U T A H 
MARK L . SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JOHN E. SWALLOW Protecting Utah • Protecting You KIRK TORGENSEN 
Chief Deputy Chief Deputy 
May 19, 2011 
Brian T. Moynihan 
President, Bank of America 
100 North Tryon St 
Charlotte, NC 28255 
Re: ReconTrust Co., N.A. 
Dear Mr. Moynihan: 
As Attorney General for the State of Utah, I ®n statutorily charged with enforcing Utah's 
laws in the State of Utah. In that capacity I have determined that ReconTrust. N.A., is not in 
compliance -with Utah Code §§57-1-21 and 57-1-23 when conducting real estate foreclosures in 
the State of Utah. 
Utah Code §§ 57-1-21(3) and 57-1-23 provide that the only valid trustees of trust deeds 
with the "power of sale'5 are those who are either members of the Utah State Bar or title 
insurance companies. Since ReconTmst is neither of these, all real estate foreclosures conducted 
by ReconTmst in the State of Utah are not in compliance with Utah's statutes, and axe hence 
illegal 
These code sections were passed by the Utah Legislature in 2001 and 2004 for the 
specific purpose of protecting Utah citizens m their homes, when they are faced with the potential 
of a real estate foreclosure. The constitutionality7- of this legislation was ultimately upheld by the 
United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Shurtleff v. Kleinsmith, 571 F.3d 1033 (2009), 
It is my understanding that ReconTrust claims that as a national bank it is exempt from 
following Utah law in exercising its fiduciaiy powers. This office adamantly disagrees with that 
position on the basis that the section of the National Bank Act granting national banks authority 
to act in a fiduciary capacity specifically states that such authority shall be exercised only Ciwhen 
not in contravention of State or local law." 12 U.S.C. 92a(a) and (b). 
UTAH STATE C A P I T O L • 350 NORTH STATE S T R E E T , SUITE 230 * P.O. Box 142320 • SALT LAKE C ITY , UTAH 84114-2320 
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Brian T. Moynihan 
President, Bank of America 
May 1-9. 2011 
Page Two of Two 
Thus, Reconl rust's exercise of fiduciary powers in the State of Utah is a violation not 
only of State law, but also applicable federal law. 
The purpose of this letter is to give you notice that the Utah Attorney General's office 
intends to enforce Utah's statutes against those conducting business in Utah, and that includes 
enforcement of the real estate trustee qualification statute. I would appreciate a response to this 
letter from you within 30 days of the date of this letter informing me of how you intend to 
proceed, I am willing to discuss this issue with you or your attorneys if yon like. 
Sincerely, 
lark ETShurtleff y 
Utah Attorney General 
MLS/se 
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Utah 
Code 
Title 57 Real Estate 
Chapter 
1 Conveyances 
^1 Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications. 
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications. 
(1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
^i^any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place within the state where 
fe^t&tftistor or other interested parties may meet with the trustee to: 
(A) request information about what is required to reinstate or payoff the obligation secured 
by the trust deed; 
(B) deliver written communications to the lender as required by both the trust deed and by 
law; 
(C) deliver funds to reinstate or payoff the loan secured by the trust deed; or 
(D) deliver funds by a bidder at a foreclosure sale to pay for the purchase of the property 
secured by the trust deed; 
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or insurance company 
authorized to do business and actually doing business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the 
United States: 
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business and actually conducting a trust 
business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United States; 
(ivj.any title insurance company or agency that: 
(A) holds a certificate of authority or license unijgj Title 31 A, Insurance Code, to conduct 
insurance business in the state;. 
(B) is actually doing business in the state; and 
(C) maintains a bona fide office in the state; 
(v) any agency of the United States government; or 
(vi) any association or corporation that is licensed, chartered, or regulated by the Farm 
Credit Administration or its successor. 
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (1). a person maintains a bona fide office within the 
state if that person maintains a physical office in the state: 
(i) that is open to the public: 
(ii) that is staffed during regular business hours on regular business days; and 
(iii) at which a trustor of a trust deed may in person: 
(A) request information regarding a trust deed; or 
(B) deliver funds, including reinstatement or payoff funds. 
(c) This Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a trust deed existing prior to May 
14, I9635 nor to any agreement that is supplemental to that trust deed. 
(d) The amendments in Laws of Utah 2002. Chapter 209, to this Subsection (1) apply only 
to a trustee that is appointed on or after May 6, 2002. 
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed, unless the 
beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), (iii), (v)5 or (vi). 
(3) The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by the trustee of 
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§ 92a* Tryst Powers, 
Archive 
United States Statutes 
Title 12. Banks and Banking 
Chapter 2, NATIONAL BANKS 
Subchapter IV, REGULATION OF THE BANKING BUSINESS; POWERS AND DUTIES OF NATIONAL BANKS 
Current through P.L 111-290 
§ 92a, Trust Powers 
(a) Authority of Comptroller of the Currency 
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to grant by special permit to national 
banks applying therefor, when not in contravention of State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, 
administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, committee of estates of 
lunatics, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which 
come into competition with national banks are permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the national 
bank is located. 
(b) Grant and exercise of powers deemed not in contravention of State or local law 
Whenever the laws of such State authorize or permit the exercise of any or ail of the foregoing powers by 
State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which compete with national banks, the granting to and the 
exercise of such powers by national banks shall not be deemed to be in contravention of State or local law within 
the meaning of this section. 
(c) Segregation of fiduciary and general assets; separate books and records; access of State banking 
authorities to reports of examinations, books, records, and assets 
National banks exercising any or all of the powers enumerating W in this section shall segregate ail assets 
held in any fiduciary capacity from the general assets of the bank and shall keep a separate set of books and 
records showing in proper detail ail transactions engaged in under authority of this section. The State banking 
authorities may have access to reports of examination made by the Comptroller of the Currency insofar as such 
reports relate to the trust department of such bank, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing 
the State banking authorities to examine the books, records, and assets of such bank. 
(d) Prohibited operations; separate investment account; collateral for certain funds used in conduct of 
business 
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No national bank shall receive in its trust department deposits of current funds subject to check or the 
deposit of checks, drafts, bills of exchange, or other items for collection or exchange purposes. Funds deposited 
or held in trust by the bank awaiting investment shall be carried in a separate account and shall not be used by 
the bank in the conduct of-its business unless it shall first set aside in the trust department United States bonds 
or other securities approved by the Comptroller of the Currency. 
(e) Lien and claim upon bank failure 
in the event of the failure of such bank the owners of the funds held in trust for investment shall have a lien 
on the bonds or other securities so set apart in addition to their claim against the estate of the bank. 
(f) Deposits of securities for protection of private or court trusts; execution of and exemption from 
bond 
Whenever the laws of a State require corporations acting in a fiduciary capacity to deposit securities with 
the State authorities for the protection of private or court trusts, national banks so acting shall be required to 
make similar deposits and securities so deposited shall be heid for the protection of private or court trusts, as 
provided by the State law. National banks in such cases shall not be required to execute the bond usually 
required of individuals if State corporations under similar circumstances are exempt from this requirement. 
National banks shall have power to execute such bond when so required by the laws of the State. 
(g) Officials' oath or affidavit 
In any case in which the iaws of a State require that a corporation acting as trustee, executor, administrator, 
or in any capacity specified in this section, shall take an oath or make an affidavit, the president, vice president, 
cashier, or trust officer of such national bank may take the necessary oath or execute the necessary affidavit. 
(h) Loans of trust funds to officers and employees prohibited; penalties 
It shall be unlawful for any national banking association to lend any officer, director, or employee any funds 
heid in trust under the powers conferred by this section. Any officer, director, or employee making such loan, or 
to whom such loan is made, may be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or may 
be both fsned and imprisoned, in the discretion of the court. 
(i) Considerations determinative of grant or denial of applications; minimum capital and surplus for 
issuance of permit 
In passing upon applications for permission to exercise the powers enumerated in this section, the 
Comptroller of the Currency may take into consideration the amount of capital and surplus of the applying bank, 
whether or not such capital and surplus is sufficient under the circumstances of the case, the needs of the 
community to be served, and any other facts and circumstances that seem to him proper, and may grant or 
refuse the application accordingly; Provided, That no permit shall be issued to any national banking association 
having a capital and surplus less than the capital and surplus required by State law of State banks, trust 
companies, and corporations exercising such powers. 
Iiftp://www f,mnc\\\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Surrender of authorization; board resolution; Comptroller certification; activities affected; 
regulations 
Any national banking association desiring to surrender its right to exercise the powers granted under this 
section, in order to relieve itself of the necessity of complying with the requirements of this section, or to have 
returned to \i any securities which it may have deposited with the State authorities for the protection of private or 
court trusts, or for any other purpose, may file with the Comptrolier of the Currency a certified copy of a resolution 
of its board of directors signifying such desire. Upon receipt of such resolution, the Comptroller of the Currency, 
after satisfying himself that such bank has been relieved in accordance with State law of ail duties as trustee, 
executoryJ2i administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, committee of 
estates of lunatics or other fiduciary, under court, private, or other appointments previously accepted under 
authority of this section, may, in his discretion, issue to such bank a certificate certifying that such bank is no 
longer authorized to exercise the powers granted by this section. Upon the issuance of such a certificate by the 
Comptroller of the Currency, such bank 
(1) shall no longer be subject to the provisions of this section or the regulations of the Comptroller of the 
Currency made pursuant thereto, 
(2) shall be entitled to have returned to it any securities which it may have deposited with the State 
authorities for the protection of private or court trusts, and 
(3) shall not exercise thereafter any of the powers granted by this section without first applying for and 
obtaining a new permit to exercise such powers pursuant to the provisions of this section, The 
Comptroller of the Currency is authorized and empowered to promulgate such regulations as he may 
deem necessary to enforce compliance with the provisions of this section and the proper exercise of the 
powers granted therein. 
Revocation; procedures appiicabie 
(1) In addition to the authority conferred by other law, if, in the opinion of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
a national banking association is unlawfully or unsoundly exercising, or has unlawfully or unsoundly 
exercised,-or has faiied for a period of five consecutive years to exercise, the powers granted by this 
section or otherwise fails or has faiied to comply with the requirements of this section, the Comptroller 
may issue and serve upon the association a notice of intent to revoke the authority of the association to 
exercise the powers granted by this section. The notice shall contain a statement of the facts 
constituting the alleged unlawful or unsound exercise of powers, or failure to exercise powers, or failure 
to comply, and shall fix a time and place at which a hearing will be held to determine whether an order 
revoking authority to exercise such powers should issue against the association. 
(2) Such hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 1818 (h) of this title, and 
subject to judicial review as provided in such section, and shall be fixed for a date not earlier than thirty 
days nor later than sixty days after service of such notice unless an earlier or later date is set by the 
Comptroller at the request of any association so served. 
(3) Unless the association so served shall appear at the hearing by a duly authorized representative, it shall 
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be deemed to have consented to the issuance of the revocation order. In the event of such consent, or if 
upon the record made at any such hearing, the Comptroller shali find that any allegation specified in the 
notice of charges has been established, the Comptroller may issue and serve upon the association an 
order prohibiting it from accepting any new or additional trust accounts and revoking authority to 
exercise any and all powers granted by this section, except that such order shall permit the association 
to continue to service all previously accepted trust accounts pending their expeditious divestiture or 
termination. 
A revocation order shali become effective not earlier than the expiration of thirty days after service of 
such order upon the association so served (except in the case of a revocation order issued upon 
consent, which shall become effective at the time specified therein), and shall remain effective and 
enforceable, except to such extent as it is stayed, modified, terminated, or set aside by action of the 
Comptroller or a reviewing court. 
[1] So \n original. Probably should be "enumerated". [2] So in original. Probably should be "executor,". 
Notes from the Office of Law Revision CounseS 
Current through 2008-06-23 
Source 
(Pub, L. 87-722, § 1, Sept 285 1962, 76 Stat 668; Pub. L. 96-221, title VII, § 704, Mar. 31, 
1980, 94 Stat 187.) 
Amendments 
1980-Subsec. (k). Pub, L. 96-221 added subsec. (k). 
Savings Provision 
Section 2 of Pub, L 87-722 provided that: "Nothing contained in this Act [enacting 
this section, amending sections 581 and 584 (a)(2) of Title 26, and repealing 
section 248 (k) of this title] shall be deemed to affect or curtail the right of any 
national bank to act in fiduciary capacities under a permit granted before the date 
of enactment of this Act [Sept. 28, 1962] by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, nor to affect the validity of any transactions entered into at any 
time by any national bank pursuant to such permit, On and after the date of 
enactment of this Act the exercise of fiduciary powers by national banks shall be 
subject to the provisions of this Act and the requirements of regulations issued by 
the Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to the authority granted by this Act." 
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§ 57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee - Payment of bid - Trustees deed 
delivered to purchaser - Recitals - Effect 
Archive 
Utah Statutes 
Title 57. Real Estate 
Chapter 1. Conveyances 
Current through 2010 Legislative Session 
§ 57-1-28= Sale of trust property by trustee - Payment of bid - Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser -
Recitals - Effect 
(1} (a) The purchaser at the saie shali pay the price bid as directed by the trustee. 
(b) The beneficiary shall receive a credit on the beneficiary's bid in an amount not to exceed the amount 
representing: 
(i) the unpaid principal owed; 
(ii) accrued interest as of the date of the sale; 
(Hi) advances for the payment of. 
(A) taxes; 
(B) insurance; and 
(C) maintenance and protection of the trust property; 
(iv) the beneficiary's lien on the trust property; and 
(v) costs of saie, including reasonable trustee's and attorney's fees. 
(2) (a) (i) Within three business days of the day the trustee receives payment of the price bid, the trustee shali make 
the trustee's 6BB6 available to the purchaser. 
(11) If the trustee does not comply with this Subsection (2)(a), the trustee is liable for any loss incurred by the 
purchaser because of the trustee's failure to comply with this Subsection (2)(a). 
http://wwJawriter^ * ™ n m 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
> 
(b) The trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance with the requirements of Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-
36 relating to the exercise of the power of sale and sale of the property described in the trustee's deed, including recitals 
concerning: 
(i) any mailing, persona! deliver/, and publication of the notice of default; 
(ii) any mailing and the publication and posting of the notice of saie; and 
(ill) the conduct of saie. 
(c) The recitals described in Subsection (2)(b): 
(i) constitute prima facie evidence of compliance with Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 ; and 
(ii) are conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice. 
(3) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, without right of redemption, the trustee's title and all 
right, title, interest, and claim of the trustor and the trustor's successors in interest and of ail persons claiming by, through, 
or under them, in and to the property sold, including all right, title, interest, and claim in and to the property acquired by 
the trustor or the trustor's successors in interest subsequent to the execution of the trust deed, which trustee's deed shall 
be considered effective and relate back to the time of the saie. 
(4) In accordance with Section 57-3-106, an interest of a purchaser in a trustee's deed that is recorded with the 
county recorder may not be divested if a person records an affidavit or other document purporting to rescind or cancel the 
trustee's deed. 
History, Amended by Chapter 381, 2010 Genera! Session 
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Association (FNMA), the Plaintiff to this action. Hence FNMA has no standing or basis 
upon which it can evict Sundquist. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 2011. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S 
Eviction Hearing Brief was mailed this 24th day of June 2011 to the following: 
Richard Gunnerson (USB No. 10862) 
Brad G. DeHann (USB No. 08168) 
Brigham Lundberg (USB No. 12583) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
A H 0 4 2011 
WEST JORDAN DEPI 
IN THE 3RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT - WEST JORDAN COURT 

































JUDGE MARK KOURIS 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on June 27, 2011. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
(From Electronic Recording) 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE OOUFT 
SEP 2 0 2011 
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1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-l-N-G-S 
2 (June 27, 2011) . 
3 THE JUDGE: Good morning. 
4 MR. HOLLAND: Your Honor, number 12. 
5 THE JUDGE: Which is? 
6 MR. HOLLAND: Fannie Mae versus Loraine 
7 Sundquist. 
8 THE JUDGE: All right. Fannie Mae. I don't see 
9 it here. Versus Sundquist? 
10 MR. HOLLAND: Yes, Your Honor. 
11 THE JUDGE: Oh, here it is. I'm sorry. 
12 Let's call the case of Federal National Mortgage 
13 versus Loraine Sundquist. This is a case that ends in 
14 8730. Counsel? 
15 MR. LUNDBERG: Brigham Lundberg for Fannie Mae. 
16 THE JUDGE: Thank you. 
17 MR. HOLLAND: Kent Holland for Loraine Sundquist. 
18 THE JUDGE: Okay. 
19 MR. HOLLAND: We prepared a brief to show why 
20 that Fannie Mae is not entitled to, to evict Loraine 
21 Sundquist. 
22 THE JUDGE: All right. Go ahead and tell me what 
23 the reason is. I've had, I reviewed your brief on Friday 
24 when it came in. 
25 MR. HOLLAND: Yes. 
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1 THE JUDGE: But go ahead and let's create a record 
2 here. Go ahead. 
3 ARGUMENT BY MR. HOLLAND 
4 MR. HOLLAND; To handle, to be able to foreclose 
5 on her property the trustee has to be a cerrain type of 
6 trustee under Utah law under 57-1-2 and 57-1-23. And they 
7 have to be a member of the Utah State Bar in good standing, 
8 residing in Utah, or they have to be an authorized title 
9 insurance authorized to do business in the State of Utah. 
10 The trust company that conducted the foreclosure is neither 
11 of those and a, so they, they fail on that point. 
12 Now, ReconTrust is a division apparently of Bank 
13 of America who claims that under the federal banking laws 
14 they can, they can be the trustee. But in quoting the 
15 12 USC 92A(a)(b), these powers to be exempt as long as they 
16 are not in, were not in contravention of state and local law 
17 is what is contained in the federal law. So they can't be 
18 it. 
19 And they have tried to act as the trustee for 
20 purposes of the foreclosure of her, of her property and 
21 they... And the attorney general in his letter of May 19 to 
22 Bank of America, which I attached as a copy, specifically 
23 points that out that they cannot do that. 
24 And in fact, there's a senate bill that is set 
25 for, that is signed by the governor and hasn't gone into 
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1 effect I don't think yet, it may be in effect right now, 
2 and that is for penalties for, against people or like, or 
3 companies like ReconTrust who have wrongfully done 
4 foreclosures when they are not authorized to do so. 
5 THE JUDGE: So what are you objecting to today? 
6 The actual eviction? 
7 MR. HOLLAND: Yes, we are. They can't evict if 
8 they don't, if they weren't in any, if they couldn't have 
9 tendered the deed to Fannie Mae. 
10 THE JUDGE: When was the, when was the default 
11 entered into? 
12 MR. HOLLAND: When was the foreclosure? 
13 THE JUDGE: Default. Did they default on the 
14 property? And it was foreclosed soon after? Is that how it 
15 went? 
16 MR. HOLLAND: Well, it went for some time. 
17 THE JUDGE: How long? 
18 MR. HOLLAND: Over two and a half years my client 
19 tried to get— 
20 THE JUDGE: So for two and a half years— 
21 MR. HOLLAND: She's tried to get the authority— 
22 THE JUDGE: — your client hasn't made a payment 
23 yet then. Is that right? 
24 MR. HOLLAND: No. She's made payments up, up 
25 until she was told not to do so by Bank of America so that 
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1 she could get a, qualify for a new loan. 
2 THE JUDGE: And how long ago was that? 
3 MR. HOLLAND: That was in March of 2 009. 
4 THE JUDGE: So she hasn't made a house payment 
5 since March of 2009? 
6 MR. HOLLAND: I don't believe so. We don't even 
7 know who we are supposed to be making house payments. She 
8 had been making house payments to Countrywide up to that 
9 point. 
10 And she just asked authority to show how they, 
11 that she was, why she was supposed to make nhem to them. 
12 And that went, as you can see by the brief and all of the 
13 documents they, they not only, she wanted to see the trust 
14 deed note that they were authorizing and they sent her a 
15 trustee note from somebody in Florida. 
16 THE JUDGE: Well, give me, well, I think we are 
17 moving in time now. 
18 So after she quit making payments when was it? 
19 Why did she stop making payments? 
20 MR. HOLLAND: Because she wasn't sure she was 
21 making payments to the correct entity, number one. 
22 THE JUDGE: So she's got that money sitting in 
23 escrow now— 
24 MR. HOLLAND: I don't know what— 
25 THE JUDGE: — so when if we figure out who the 
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1 right payment is— 
2 MR. HOLLAND: I cannot tell you that, 
3 Your Honor. I don't know whether she does or not. But— 
4 THE JUDGE: Will she be prepared then to make up 
5 those back payments to stay in the house? 
6 MR. HOLLAND: If, if she needs to. I think— 
7 THE JUDGE: All right. What is— 
8 MR. HOLLAND: — down the road— 
9 THE JUDGE: — the mortgage payment currently, do 
10 you know? 
11 MR. HOLLAND: I don't know. I think itTs $700 a 
12 month. 
13 THE JUDGE: So if we times 700 by what, 24, 3 7 
14 times, what is that, $42,000, she'd be ready to pay that at 
15 this point as a bond? 
16 MR. HOLLAND: I don't know. But I don't think 
17 that's what we are here for right now. What we are here for 
18 is Fannie Mae is trying to evict her— 
19 THE JUDGE: Right. So if I stay— 
20 MR. HOLLAND: — based on their transfer— 
21 THE JUDGE: Right. But if I, right, if I stayed 
22 the eviction, if I stayed the— 
23 MR. HOLLAND: And they don't have any right to 
24 it. 
25 THE JUDGE: — eviction to allow you to, to 
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1 litigate this matter— 
2 MR. HOLLAND: Yes. 
3 THE JUDGE: — then she would put in the bank the 
4 amount that she owed up to this point in escrow? 
5 MR. HOLLAND: Well, she could maybe post a bond, 
6 I don't know if she has all of the cash, but she could 
7 probably post a bond. 
8 THE JUDGE: Well, she could post a bond that 
9 would equal the amount of payments that she had missed at 
10 this point? 
11 MR. HOLLAND: I would think that would be 
12 possible. 
13 THE JUDGE: You do think so? 
14 MR. HOLLAND: I don't know. That I don't know. 
15 I'd have to discuss her finances with her. 
16 THE JUDGE: Counsel? 
17 ARGUMENT BY MR. LUNDBERG 
18 MR. LUNDBERG: Your Honor, the only issue here 
19 seems to be ReconTrustrs authority to foreclose. This has 
20 already been litigated. The only actual opinion out there 
21 is from Judge Waddoups in the federal court and it 
22 specifically states that through the National Banking Act 
23 it preempts the legislation here in the State of Utah. 
24 Therefore there's, there's nothing currently that prevents 
25 ReconTrust from foreclosing in the state. That's been 
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1 appealed to the 10th Circuit. There's been no decision at 
2 this point. Therefore, the current state of the law allows 
3 them to foreclose. 
4 THE JUDGE: Tell me the relevance of the, I know 
5 the govenor made some, or not the governor rather, but the 
6 attorney general made some proclamation. 
7 MR. LUNDBERG: They filed— 
8 THE JUDGE: Tell me what that's about. 
9 MR. LUNDBERG: Yes. They filed an amecus brief 
10 on behalf of the home owner in that case. They've also 
11 written a letter to Bank of America and began discussions 
12 to try to work things out. I don't know what action Bank 
13 of America is going to take, if they are going to start 
14 using an attorney licensed here to do their foreclosure 
15 work. 
16 However, currently there's nothing that prevents 
17 ReconTrust from foreclosing. There had been a TRO at one 
18 point for a week, it was dissolved by Judge Waddoups. And 
19 that's been the state of the law for a year now. 
20 There's no dispute that there was a default here 
21 way back in early 2009. The property was sold on May 17. 
22 Notices to quit were served on June 1st. The defendants 
23 haven't made payments and have not vacated the property. 
2 4 Therefore we would argue Fannie Mae should be entitled to an 
25 order of restitution. 
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1 THE JUDGE: Okay. 
2 MR. HOLLAND: I think the Utah statutes are 
3 extremely clear and as is that the bank act they claim to 
4 have this authority under says as long as it's not in 
5 contravension with Utah law. And those, both those points 
6 are pointed out in Attorney General Shurtliff's letter to the 
7 president of the Bank of America— 
8 THE JUDGE: But that letter certainly isn't the 
9 law though. Right. 
10 MR. HOLLAND: No, it isn?t the law. 
11 THE JUDGE: Okay. 
12 MR. HOLLAND: But it is, it is a specific 
13 pointing out what the law is under the statute. 
14 THE JUDGE: Has the house been resold? Has the 
15 house been resold? 
16 MR. LUNDBERG: It hasn't yet, Your Honor, because 
17 Fannie Mae doesn't have possession of it yet. They are still 
18 in the home and that's what we are trying to get. 
19 The arguments that have been made in the amecus 
20 brief and the letter, those were made in front of 
21 Judge Waddoups and he overruled them that, you know, the 
22 National Banking Act preempts this. So there are claims 
23 that can be made. But until there's a ruling to that 
24 effect, the state of the law is that ReconTrust can move 
25 forward. 
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1 COURT'S RULING 
2 THE JUDGE: Okay. Ifm going to deny the motion 
3 at this point to, to vacate the eviction and I will sign an 
4 order of restitution when you have it prepared. Okay? 
5 MR. LUNDBERG: I will prepare that, Your Honor. 
6 MR. HOLLAND: Now, how much time do we have for 
7 the eviction? 
8 THE JUDGE: How much time can you give them? 
9 MR. HOLLAND: A week? 
10 MR. LUNDBERG: We could give them a week, 
11 Your Honor. 
12 THE JUDGE: Okay. We'll give them seven days. 
13 MR. HOLLAND: And we'll have time for an appeal. 
14 THE JUDGE: Absolutely. 
15 MR. HOLLAND: Thank you. 
16 THE JUDGE: You bet. 
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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION 
2 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
3 ) SS. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
4 
5 
6 I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
7 Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify 
8 that I received the electronically recorded proceedings in 
9 the matter of Federal Nat'1 Mortgage vs. Sundquist, hearing 
10 date June 27, 2011, and that I transcribed it into 
11 typewriting and that a full, true and correct transcription 
12 of said hearing so recorded and transcribed is set forth in 
13 the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 11, inclusive, 
14 including where it is indicated that the recording was 
15 inaudible. 
16 I further certify that I am not of kin nor otherwise 
17 associated with any of the parties to this cause of action 
18 and am not interested in the event thereof. 
19 WITNESS my hand and official seal this 3rd day of 
20 August, 2011. 
21 
22 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER/NOTARY 
23 License 22-102811-7801 
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FEDERAL NATL MORTGAGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 














Defendant !s Attorney(s) 
Audio 
RICHARD J GUNNERSON 
J. KENT HOLLAND 
Tape Number: 31 Tape Count: 8:54 
HEARING 
Counsel for the defendant proffers and argues this case. 
Plaintiff responds to the arguments. Court orders eviction to go 
forward and an order of restitution to be issued within a week as 
prayed. 
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Richard Gunnerson (USB No. 10862) 
Brad G. DeHaan (USB No. 08168) 
Brigham Lundberg (USB No. 12583) 
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 263-3400 
L&ACaseNo. 11-13010/KHE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




LORATNE SUNDQUIST and JOHN 
DOE/JANE DOE/OCCUPANT, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
Civil No. 110408730 
Judge Bruce Lubeck 
TO THE DEFENDANTS: 
Within seven (7) days following the service of this Order of Restitution upon you, you must 
vacate the premises located at 1599 East 12700 South, Draper, UT 84020, more particularly 
described as follows: 
Parcel 1: 
Beginning at a point 3368.45 feet West and 372.00 feet South from the Northeast corner of 
Section 33, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence North 129.00 feet; thence East 86 feet, more or less, to the center of canal; thence 
Southeasterly along the center of said canal to a point due East of beginning; thence West to 
the point of beginning. 
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Parcel 1A: 
Right of Way: 
Commencing at a point in the center of a 50 foot road and center of a canal; West 3191.45 
feet and South 512 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 33, Township 2 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 177 feet along center of road; 
thence North 140 feet; thence due East to center of canal and running thence South 6°30' East 
along the center of canal the place of beginning. 
Less and Excepting therefrom any portion contained within the Draper Irrigation Right-of-
Way. 
Subject to current general taxes, easements, restrictions, reservations and right-of-ways 
appearing of record. 
Also, within seven (7) days following the service of the Order of Restitution upon you, you 
must remove your personal property, and restore possession of the premises to the plaintiff, or be 
forcibly removed by a Sheriff or Constable. 
Pursuant to Section §78B-6-812 of the Utah Code, you are advised of your right to contest 
the terms of this order of restitution or the manner of its enforcement. To do so you must file a 
request for hearing within three (3) days after service of this order. 
If you fail to comply with this Order of Restitution within seven (7) days following its 
service upon you, the Sheriff or Constable may, at the direction of the plaintiff, enter the premises 
by force using the least destructive means possible to remove you, your personal property, and any 
persons claiming a right to occupancy from you. 
TO THE SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE OF SALT LAKE COUNTY: 
Judgment was entered by the Court on the date below, for restitution to plaintiff of the 
premises located at 1599 East 12700 South, Draper, UT 84020, more particularly described as 
follows: 
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Parcel 1 : 
Beginning at a point 3368.45 feet West and 372.00 feet South from the Northeast corner of 
Section 33, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence North 129.00 feet; thence East 86 feet, more or less, to the center of canal; thence 
Southeasterly along the center of said canal to a point due East of beginning; thence West to 
the point of beginning. 
Parcel 1A: 
Right of Way: 
Commencing at a point in the center of a 50 foot road and center of a canal; West 3191.45 
feet and South 512 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 33, Township 2 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 177 feet along center of road; 
thence North 140 feet; thence due East to center of canal and running thence South 6°30' 
East along the center of canal the place of beginning. 
Less and Excepting therefrom any portion contained within the Draper Irrigation Right-of-
Way. 
Subject to current general taxes, easements, restrictions, reservations and right-of-ways 
appearing of record. 
Therefore, you are commanded, as Sheriff or Constable, to restore to the plaintiff or its 
representative, the premises located at 1599 East 12700 South, Draper, UT 84020, by removing the 
defendants and any other unknown persons seven (7) days following service of this order. You are 
hereby authorized to use appropriate force, if necessary, to restore said premises to the plaintiff. 
DATED this day of , 2011. 
BY THE COURT 
District Court Judge 
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> 
Richard Gunnerson (USB No. 10862) 
Brad G. DeHaan (USB No. 08168) 
Brigham Lundberg (USB No. 12583) 
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 263-3400 
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LORAINE SUNDQUIST and JOHN 
DOE/JANE DOE/OCCUPANT, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Civil No. 110408730 
Judge Bruce Lubeck 
I certify that on the /^ j day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order 
of Restitution was mailed by first class United States mail to: 
J. Kent Holland 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 902278 
Sandy, UT 84090-2278 
John Doe/Jane Doe/Occupant 
1599 East 12700 South 
Draper, UT 84020 
^kfli^^ ^Sfdho/j^ri 
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(D LexisNexis® 
1 of 2 DOCUMENTS 
FRANCIS J. BEVILACQUA, THIRD vs. PABLO RODRIGUEZ. 
SJC-10880 
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 
2011 Mass. LEXIS 918 
May 2,2011, Argued 
October 18,2011, Decided 
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] 
Suffolk. Civil action commenced in the Land Court 
Department on April 12, 2010. The case was heard by 
Keith C. Long, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review. 
Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 18 LCR 451, 2010 Mass. LCR 
LEXIS 90 (2010) 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff purchaser 
brought an action to try title pursuant to Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 240, §§ 1-5. Respondent mortgagee was not 
located and did not enter an appearance. The Land Court 
(Massachusetts), on its own motion, dismissed the com-
plaint with prejudice, finding that the purchaser held no 
title to the property and thus lacked standing to bring the 
try title action. The purchaser appealed. 
OVERVIEW: The mortgagee granted a mortgage on the 
property to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems 
(MERS). Prior to assigning the mortgage, a bank ex-
ecuted a foreclosure deed purporting to transfer the 
property from the bank to the bank as trustee under a 
securitization servicing agreement. Nearly one month 
later, MERS assigned the mortgage to the bank. A con-
firmatory foreclosure deed was later granted by the bank 
to the bank as trustee under the servicing agreement. 
Eight days later, the bank as trustee granted the quitclaim 
deed to the purchaser. Although the purchaser was in 
physical possession of the property when he filed the try 
title action, he lacked standing because his chain of title 
rested on a foreclosure sale conducted by someone other 
than the mortgagee or his successors. A single deed con-
sidered without reference to its chain of title was insuffi-
cient to show record title as required by Mass. Gen. Laws 
ch. 240, § 1. Furthermore, the purchaser could not claim 
record title based on a theory that he was a bona fide 
purchaser for value and without notice. The dismissal 
should have been entered without prejudice, however, 
because it was a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the dismissal of the 
complaint, but remanded for entry of a dismissal without 
prejudice. 
CORE TERMS: mortgage, deed, foreclosure, mortga-
gee, recorded, registry, bona fide purchaser, equity of 
redemption, quitclaim deed, mortgagor, notice, adverse 
claim, matter jurisdiction, ownership, foreclose, grantor, 
power of sale, purchaser, assignee, chain, foreclosure 
sale, recording, default, holder, purported, jurisdictional 
facts, adverse claimants, jurisdictional, favorable, voida-
ble 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Juris-
diction > General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Dismissals > General Overview 
[HN1] Pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), whenever it 
appears by suggestion of a party or otherwise that the 
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court 
shall dismiss the action. 
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses, 
Demurrers & Objections > Motions to Dismiss 
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Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
General Overview 
Real Property Law > Adverse Possession > Procedure 
[HN2] A court's sua sponte motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction is analogous to a party's mo-
tion to dismiss under either Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) or 
(6). Ordinarily, in reviewing a dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(1) or (6), an appellate court accepts the factual 
allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint, as well as any 
favorable inferences reasonably drawn from them, as 
true. The unusual mechanics of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
240, §§ 1-5, however, suggest that the analogy may not 
be perfect and that a different standard may be appropri-
ate in a try title action. If a plaintiff brings a try title ac-
tion and the respondent defaults, the court shall enter a 
decree that the respondent be forever barred from having 
or enforcing any such claim adversely to the petitioner. 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 240, § 2. As a result, a property 
owner whose whereabouts are unknown and who is not 
reached through publication notice might be divested by 
a plaintiff who is put to no greater evidentiary test than 
having pleaded facts that the court is obliged to accept as 
true. But Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 240, § 4 provides reme-
dies for those dispossessed by default judgment. 
Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Juris-
diction > Jurisdiction Over Actions > Limited Jurisdic-
tion 
Real Property Law > Adverse Possession > Procedure 
[HN3] Try title actions under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 240, 
§§ 1-5, are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of 
the Land Court. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 185, § 1(d). If the 
petitioner cannot satisfy the jurisdictional requirements 
of the statute, then the Land Court is without subject 
matter jurisdiction and the petition must be dismissed. 
The Land Court is a statutory court, not of general but of 
strictly limited jurisdiction. 
Real Property Law > Adverse Possession > Procedure 
[HN4] See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 240, § L 
Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Juris-
diction > Jurisdiction Over Actions > General Overview 
Real Property Law > Adverse Possession > Procedure 
[HN5] There are two steps to a try title action: the first, 
which requires the plaintiff to establish jurisdictional 
facts such that the adverse claimant might be summoned 
to show cause why he should not bring an action to try 
his claim, and the second, which requires the adverse 
claimant either to disclaim the relevant interest in the 
property or to bring an action to assert the claim in ques-
tion. The establishment of jurisdictional facts, although 
essential in all cases, is thus a matter of particular sa-
lience in the initial stage of a try title action. There ap-
pear to be two jurisdictional facts that must be shown to 
establish standing under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 240, § 1. 
First, it is clear on the face of the statute that only a per-
son in possession of the disputed property may maintain 
a try title action. Second, although less obviously clear, a 
plaintiff must hold a record title to the land in question. 
Real Property Law > Adverse Possession > Elements of 
Adverse Claims 
[HN6] A disseisor is one who puts another out of the 
possession of his lands wrongfully; a settled trespasser 
on the land of another. 
Real Property Law > Adverse Possession > Procedure 
Real Property Law > Title Quality > Adverse Claim 
Actions > Quiet Title Actions 
[HN7] An action to quiet title is an in rem action, Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 240, §10, brought under the court's equity 
jurisdiction. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 185, § l(k). In equity, 
the general doctrine is well settled that a bill to remove a 
cloud from the land requires that both actual possession 
and the legal title are united in the plaintiff. In contrast, 
an action to try title is an action at law brought against 
the respondent as an individual. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
240, § 2. The court shall enter a decree that specified 
adverse claimants be forever barred from having or en-
forcing any such claim adversely to the petitioner. The 
distinction is critical because the plaintiff in a try title 
action may defeat the specified adverse claims through a 
default or by showing title that is merely superior to that 
of the respondent. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 240, §§ 2-3. In 
contrast, a quiet title action requires the plaintiff not 
merely to demonstrate better title to the locus than the 
defendants possess, but requires the plaintiff to prove 
sufficient title to succeed in its action. Precedent appli-
cable to one statute, although potentially persuasive, does 
not control cases brought under the other statute. 
Real Property Law > Priorities & Recording > Record-
ing Acts 
[HN8] There is nothing magical in the act of recording 
an instrument with the registry that invests an otherwise 
meaningless document with legal effect. The function of 
a registry of deeds is to record documents. It is essen-
tially a ministerial function. Recording may be necessary 
to place the world on notice of certain transactions. Re-
cording is not sufficient in and of itself, however, to 
render an invalid document legally significant. As a re-
sult, it is the effectiveness of a document that is control-
ling rather than its mere existence. Accordingly, a single 
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deed considered without reference to its chain of title is 
insufficient to show record title as required by Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 240, § 1. 
Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other 
Security Instruments > Foreclosures > Judicial Forec-
losures 
[HN9] Massachusetts adheres to the familiar rule that 
one who sells under a power of sale must follow strictly 
its terms so, where a foreclosure sale occurs in the ab-
sence of authority, there is no valid execution of the 
power, and the sale is wholly void. One of the terms of 
the power of sale that must be strictly adhered to is the 
restriction on who is entitled to foreclose. 
Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other 
Security Instruments > General Overview 
[HN10] Massachusetts is a title theory State in which a 
mortgage is a transfer of legal title in a property to secure 
a debt. 
Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other 
Security Instruments > Formalities 
[UN 11] It is possible for a foreclosure deed, ineffective 
due to noncompliance with the power of sale, to never-
theless operate as an assignment of the mortgage itself. 
The theory is that where a deed of real estate shows by 
its language that it was intended to pass title by one form 
of conveyance, by which however title could not pass, 
courts have made the deed effective by construing it as a 
deed of some other form, notwithstanding the inappro-
priateness of the language. Because an assignment of a 
mortgage is a transfer of legal title, it becomes effective 
only on the transfer; it cannot become effective before 
the transfer. 
Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other 
Security Instruments > Equitable Mortgages 
Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other 
Security Instruments > Redemption > Mortgagor's 
Right 
[HN12] In Massachusetts, a mortgage splits the title in 
two parts: the legal title, which becomes the mortgagee's, 
and the equitable title, which the mortgagor retains. The 
purpose of the split is to give to the mortgagee an effec-
tual security for the payment of a debt while leaving to 
the mortgagor the full control, disposition and ownership 
of the estate. The title held by a mortgagee is defeasible 
and upon payment of the note by the mortgagor, the 
mortgagee's interest in the real property comes to an end. 
Inherent in this concept of the mortgagee's defeasible 
title is the mortgagor's equity of redemption. The mort-
gagor's equity of redemption is the basic and historic 
right of a debtor to redeem the mortgage obligation after 
its due date, and ultimately to insist on foreclosure as the 
means of terminating the mortgagor's interest in the 
mortgaged real estate. 
Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other 
Security Instruments > Redemption > Mortgagor's 
Right 
[HN13] An equity of redemption is inseparably con-
nected with a mortgage, and endures so long as the 
mortgage continues in existence. When the right of re-
demption is foreclosed, the mortgage has done its work 
and the property is no longer mortgaged land. Instead, 
the former mortgagee owns the legal and equitable inter-
ests in the property and the mortgage no longer exists. 
Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 18, the mortgagor 
holds the equity of redemption until the mortgagor fo-
recloses. Upon payment of the note by the mortgagor, the 
mortgagee's interest in the real property comes to an end. 
Following default, therefore, a mortgagee may enter and 
possess the property but his or her title remains subject to 
the mortgagor's equity of redemption. Mass. Gen. Laws 
ch. 244, §§ 7, 2. This right of entry and possession dis-
tinguishes title and lien theory States. This state of affairs 
persists until either the mortgagee brings a proceeding to 
foreclose on the equity of redemption or until the mort-
gagor redeems the property and brings the mortgagee's 
interests in the property to an end. 
Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other 
Security Instruments > Foreclosures > General Over-
view 
Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other 
Security Instruments > Redemption > General Over-
view 
[HN14] Foreclosure is the appropriate remedy for a 
mortgagee seeking to resolve an outstanding equity of 
redemption. 
Real Property Law > Deeds > Types > Quit Claim 
Deeds 
Real Property Law > Priorities & Recording > Bona 
Fide Purchasers 
[HN15] In some States, one who has only a quitclaim 
deed to land cannot claim protection as a bona fide pur-
chaser without notice. In Massachusetts, however, such a 
deed is as effectual to transfer whatever title the grantor 
has in the premises, as a deed with full covenants of 
warranty. The conveyance in either form is voidable, and 
not void, if fraudulent as to creditors; and, until defeated 
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by a creditor, the title of the grantor passes. If a grantor 
has voidable title to a Massachusetts property, therefore, 
that title may pass through a quitclaim deed to a bona 
fide purchaser in whose hands the title is no longer 
voidable. 
Real Property Law > Priorities & Recording > Bona 
Fide Purchasers 
[HN16] The law goes a great way in protecting the title 
of a purchaser for value without notice or knowledge of 
any defect in the power of the vendor to sell. For that 
reason, the purchaser's title is not to be affected by mere 
irregularities in executing a power of sale contained in a 
mortgage, of which irregularities he has no knowledge, 
actual or constructive. There are limits to the protections 
provided to bona fide purchasers, however, and the pur-
chaser of an apparently perfect record title is not pro-
tected against all adverse claims. Where the bona fide 
purchaser is not protected against an adverse claim the 
purchaser must rely upon the covenants of his deed ra-
ther than dispossession of the true owner - that is, there 
are situations in which it is the purchaser rather than the 
original owner who must seek recovery from a third 
person rather than being awarded possession of the 
property itself. Generally, the key question in this regard 
is whether the transaction is void, in which case it is a 
nullity such that title never left possession of the original 
owner, or merely voidable in which case a bona fide 
purchaser may take good title. 
Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other 
Security Instruments > Foreclosures > General Over-
view 
Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other 
Security Instruments > Formalities 
[HN17] Any effort to foreclose by a party lacking juris-
diction and authority to carry out a foreclosure under the 
relevant statutes is void. 
Real Property Law > Priorities & Recording > Bona 
Fide Purchasers 
[HN18] Parties may not establish themselves as bona 
fide purchasers simply by claiming that they were bliss-
fully unaware of facts to which they closed their eyes. 
Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing > General 
Overview 
Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Juris-
diction > Jurisdiction Over Actions > General Overview 
[HN19] The issue of standing is one of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Juris-
diction > Jurisdiction Over Actions > General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Dismissals > General Overview 
[HN20] A complaint that is dismissed for lack of juris-
diction is not an adjudication on the merits. Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 41(b)(3). It is thus inappropriate to attach preclusive 
effects to the dismissal beyond the matter actually de-
cided - the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. 
HEADNOTES 
Jurisdiction, Land Court. Land Court, Jurisdiction. 
Practice, Civil, Parties, Standing, Dismissal. Real Prop-
erty, Ownership, Record title, Mortgage, Bona fide pur-
chaser. Mortgage, Real estate, Foreclosure, Assignment, 
Equity of redemption. 
COUNSEL: Jeffrey B. Loeb (David Glod with him) for 
the plaintiff. 
Richard A. Oetheimer (Natalie F. Langlois with him) for 
Mortgage Bankers Association. 
Max Weinstein for WilmerHale Legal Services Center of 
Harvard Law School. 
John M. Stephan & Amber Anderson Villa, Assistant 
Attorneys General, for the Commonwealth. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Mark B. 
Johnson for American Land Title Association. 
Adam J. Levitin, of the District of Columbia, Christopher 
L. Peterson, of Utah, John A.E. Pottow, of Michigan, & 
Katherine Porter, Pro se. 
Edward Rainen, Carrie B. Rainen, & Ward P. Graham 
for Massachusetts Association of Bank Counsel, Inc. 
JUDGES: Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, 
Gants, & Duffly, JJ. 
OPINION BY: SPINA 
OPINION 
SPINA, J. In this case we must determine whether a 
plaintiff has standing to maintain a try title action under 
G. L. c. 240, §§ 1-5, where he is in physical possession 
of real property but his chain of title rests on a foreclo-
sure sale conducted by someone other than "the mortga-
gee or [*2] his executors, administrators, successors or 
assigns." G. L. c. 183, §21 (statutory power of sale). See 
G. L. c. 244, § 14 (procedure for foreclosure under power 
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of sale). On his own motion, a Land Court judge deter-
mined that the plaintiff, Francis J. Bevilacqua, III, "holds 
no title to the property at 126-128 Summer Street in Ha-
verhill," and thus lacks standing to bring a try title action. 
The judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice and 
Bevilacqua appealed. We granted Bevilacqua's applica-
tion for direct appellate review and now affirm the dis-
missal of his complaint but conclude that such dismissal 
should have been entered without prejudice.1 
1 We gratefully acknowledge the amicus briefs 
submitted by the American Land Title Associa-
tion; the Attorney General of the Commonwealth; 
the Massachusetts Association of Bank Counsel, 
Inc.; the Mortgage Bankers Association; Profes-
sors Adam J. Levitin, Christopher L. Peterson, 
Katherine Porter, and John A.E. Pottow; and the 
WilmerHale Legal Services Center of Harvard 
Law School. 
1. Procedural background. This case comes before 
us on a highly unusual procedural footing. The respon-
dent, Pablo Rodriguez, has not been located and accor-
dingly has [*3] not entered an appearance. As a result, 
it fell to the Land Court judge to raise the issue of Bevi-
lacqua's standing under G. L. c. 240, § 1. See [HN1] 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) (3), 365 Mass. 754 (1974) 
("Whenever it appears by suggestion of a party or other-
wise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter, the court shall dismiss the action"); Maxwell v. AIG 
Domestic Claims, Inc., ante 91, 99-100 (2011); Sullivan 
v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court, 
448 Mass. 15, 21, 858 N.E.2d 699 (2006); Litton Busi-
ness Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 383 Mass. 
619, 622, 420 N.E.2d 339 (1981). The procedures appli-
cable to such a sua sponte motion in a try title action are 
unclear and the judge did not specify the rule under 
which the dismissal was ordered. We have received no 
briefing on the issue from Bevilacqua, and those amici 
addressing the point note that the absence of precedent 
leads them to ffpresume[]" the applicable standard. 
In considering the appropriate procedure, we note 
that [HN2] a court's sua sponte motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is analogous to a par-
ty's motion to dismiss under either Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 
(b) (1) or (6)9 365 Mass. 754 (1974). Ordinarily, "[i]n 
reviewing [*4] a dismissal under rule 12 (b) (1) or (6), 
we accept the factual allegations in the plaintiffs' com-
plaint, as well as any favorable inferences reasonably 
drawn from them, as true." Ginther v. Commissioner of 
Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 322, 693 N.E.2d 153 (1998). Cf. 
lannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636, 888 
N.E.2d 879 (2008), quoting Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 
(2007) (clarifying standards for dismissal under rule 12 
[b] [6]). The unusual mechanics of G. L. c. 240, §§ 1-5, 
however, suggest that the analogy may not be perfect and 
that a different standard may be appropriate.2 We need 
not resolve the issue today, however, because we con-
clude that Bevilacqua's complaint must be dismissed 
even if we apply the most favorable of the possible stan-
dards of review. See Ginther v. Commissioner of Ins., 
supra (standards for motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction). We thus "accept the factual allega-
tions in [Bevilacqua's petition], as well as any favorable 
inferences reasonably drawn from them, as true." Id. 
Those facts are as follows. 
2 It may not be desirable merely to assume the 
accuracy of a plaintiffs's factual assertions. If a 
plaintiff brings a try title action and the respon-
dent [*5] defaults, "the court shall enter a decree 
that [the respondent] be forever barred from hav-
ing or enforcing any such claim adversely to the 
petitioner." G. L. c. 240, § 2. As a result, a prop-
erty owner whose whereabouts are unknown and 
who is not reached through publication notice 
might be divested by a plaintiff who is put to no 
greater evidentiary test than having pleaded facts 
that the court is obliged to accept as true. See 
Ginther v. Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 
322, 693 N.E.2dl53 (1998). But see G L. c. 240, 
§ 4 (remedies for those dispossessed by default 
judgment). Here, for instance, there are no rec-
orded instruments in evidence and Bevilacqua 
merely has alleged their existence and contents. 
A better approach, consistent with the pro-
cedure followed in the case of a motion to dis-
miss due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
may be to place the burden of proof on the non-
moving party (here, Bevilacqua) to prove juris-
dictional facts. See, e.g., Caffyn v. Caffyn, 441 
Mass. 487, 491, 806 KE.2d 415 (2004). As dis-
cussed further, infra at - , the existence of 
record title is a requirement for standing under G. 
L. c. 240, § 7, and thus a jurisdictional fact. That 
said, application of a preponderance [*6] of the 
evidence standard may be inappropriate at this 
stage of a try title proceeding if it is indistin-
guishable from "the question whether [the plain-
tiff] has a better title [than the respondent]" - a 
matter that "is not to be determined in these pro-
ceedings, but in the actions which the respon-
dents may be ordered to bring" as a result of the 
try title action. Blanchard v. Lowell, 177 Mass. 
501, 504-505, 59 N.E. 114 (1901). Given these 
difficulties, it may be necessary to adopt a unique 
standard of review in future try title actions. 
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On March 18, 2005, Pablo Rodriguez granted a 
mortgage on the property to Mortgage Electronic Regis-
tration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for Finance 
America, LLC. The mortgage was recorded at the 
Southern Essex registry of deeds (registry). As of June 
29, 2006, MERS had not assigned the mortgage to U.S. 
Bank National Association (U.S. Bank) but, on that date, 
U.S. Bank executed a foreclosure deed referencing the 
mortgage and purporting to transfer the property pur-
suant to a foreclosure sale from U.S. Bank (as trustee 
under a trust that is not further described) to U.S. Bank 
"as Trustee under the securitization Servicing Agreement 
dated as of July 1, 2005 Structured [*7] Asset Securi-
ties Corporation Structure Asset Investment Loan Trust 
Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2005-HEI." 
Nearly one month later, on July 21, 2006, MERS as-
signed the mortgage to U.S. Bank in an assignment of 
mortgage recorded at the registry. A "confirmatory fo-
reclosure deed" was then granted on October 9, 2006, by 
U.S. Bank to U.S. Bank as trustee under the servicing 
agreement. Eight days later, on October 17, 2006, U.S. 
Bank "as Trustee" granted a quitclaim deed to Bevilac-
qua. 
On April 12, 2010, Bevilacqua filed a petition to 
compel Rodriguez to try title to the property. In his com-
plaint Bevilacqua claimed to reside at the property and to 
hold record title. Because of the fact that MERS had not 
assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank at the time of the 
foreclosure, Bevilacqua alleged that there is a cloud on 
his title in the form of "the possibility of an adverse 
claim by Rodriguez against Bevilacqua's title to the 
[property." 
2. Statutory background. Bevilacqua seeks an order 
that either compels Rodriguez to bring an action to try 
his title or forever bars him from enforcing his adverse 
claims to the property. [HNS] Try title actions under G 
L. c. 240, §§ 1-5, are within the [*8] exclusive original 
jurisdiction of the Land Court. G. L. c. 185, § 1 (d). If 
Bevilacqua cannot satisfy the jurisdictional requirements 
of the statute, then the Land Court is without subject 
matter jurisdiction and the petition must be dismissed. 
See Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth, 
374 Mass. 37, 46, 371 N.E.2d 728 (1977); Riverbank 
Improvement Co. v. Chapman, 224 Mass. 424, 425, 113 
N.E. 215 (1916) ("The Land Court is a statutory court, 
not of general but of strictly limited jurisdiction"). 
The statute states, in relevant part: 
[HN4] "If the record title of land is 
clouded by an adverse claim, or by the 
possibility thereof, a person in possession 
of such land claiming an estate of freehold 
therein . . . may file a petition in the land 
court stating his interest, describing the 
land, the claims and the possible adverse 
claimants so far as known to him, and 
praying that such claimants may be sum-
moned to show cause why they should not 
bring an action to try such claim." 
G. L. c. 240, § 1. [HN5] There are thus two steps to a try 
title action: the first, which requires the plaintiff to estab-
lish jurisdictional facts such that the adverse claimant 
might be "summoned to show cause why [he] should not 
bring an action [*9] to try [his] claim," and the second, 
which requires the adverse claimant either to disclaim 
the relevant interest in the property or to bring an action 
to assert the claim in question.3 Id. See Blanchard v. Lo-
well, 177 Mass. 501, 504-505, 59 N.E. 114 (1901). The 
establishment of jurisdictional facts, although essential in 
all cases, is thus a matter of particular salience in the 
initial stage of a try title action. 
3 As discussed further, infra, the structure of 
the try title statute is a direct reflection of the li-
mitations inherent in the common-law writ of en-
try. The try title statute may now be something of 
an anachronism when it is considered that mod-
ern statutes are far more flexible than the com-
mon-law writ, see G. L. c. 237; that Massachu-
setts courts are now vested with equity jurisdic-
tion, see, e.g., G. L. c. 185, § l(k)\ and that dec-
laratory judgment is now available to litigants in 
this Commonwealth, see G. L. c. 231A inserted 
by St. 1945, c. 582, §1 . 
There appear to be two jurisdictional facts that must 
be shown to establish standing under G. L. c. 240, § 1. 
First, it is clear on the face of the statute that only "a 
person in possession" of the disputed property may 
maintain a try title [*10] action. Id. Second, although 
less obviously clear, a plaintiff must hold a "record title" 
to the land in question. Blanchard v. Lowell, supra at 
504. Arnold v. Reed, 162 Mass. 438, 440-441, 38 N.E. 
1132 (1894). Here, Bevilacqua has alleged that he re-
sides on the property, a factual assertion that we accept 
as true and from which we draw the favorable inference 
that he is "a person in possession" as required by G L. c. 
240, § 7.4 Bevilacqua also claims to hold record title to 
the property as required to support standing. See Blan-
chard v. Lowell, supra. In dismissing the petition the 
judge concluded that the facts alleged by Bevilacqua did 
not support his claim of record title and that, as a result, 
Bevilacqua lacked standing. This is the controversy pre-
sented on appeal. 
4 One of the amici has appended to its brief a 
number of deeds referring to the property at 
126-128 Summer Street in Haverhill that were 
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recorded between the time Bevilacqua purchased 
the property and the date on which he filed his 
petition. Specifically, Bevilacqua recorded a 
master deed establishing a condominium that 
consists of four units. Bevilacqua also recorded 
three deeds transferring units to various 
third-party purchasers. [*11] These deeds and 
the conveyances they represent are not matters 
properly before the court and do not factor into 
our analysis. Although nonevidentiary, the deeds 
are nevertheless noteworthy in that they explain 
why Bevilacqua's complaint is drafted to imply 
possession rather than pleading the matter direct-
ly, see Connolley, petitioner, 168 Mass. 201, 203, 
46 N.E. 618 (1897) ("the only question . . . is 
whether the petitioner has a record title to the 
whole estate"), and in that they highlight the 
concerns addressed, see note 2, supra, regarding 
the proper standards of review and evidentiary 
burdens in a try title action. 
Before analyzing whether Bevilacqua has demon-
strated the existence of record title, and in light of the 
fact that it has been more than a century since this court 
last examined standing under G. L. c. 240, §§ 1-5, we 
first consider the history and purposes of the statute.5 The 
initial try title statute was enacted in 1851 and provided: 
"Any person in possession of real 
property, claiming an estate of freehold . . 
. may file a petition in the supreme judi-
cial court, setting forth his estate . . . and 
averring that he is credibly informed and 
believes, that the respondent makes some 
[*12] claim adverse to the estate of the 
petitioner, and praying that he may be 
summoned to show cause, why he should 
not bring an action to try the alleged title, 
if any." St 1851, c. 233, § 66. 
Prior to enactment of this statute, the principal means of 
trying title to land was the writ of entry, which permitted 
a plaintiff to "obtain possession of real estate from a dis-
seisor who is in possession and holds the demandant 
out." Meadv. Cutler, 208 Mass. 391, 392, 94 N.E. 478 
(1911). See Black's Law Dictionary 472 (6th ed. 1990) 
([HN6] disseisor is "[o]ne who puts another out of the 
possession of his lands wrongfully. A settled trespasser 
on the land of another"). See also Black's Law Dictionary 
541 (9th ed. 2009). The writ was limited, however, by 
the fact that it could only be brought where the plaintiff 
was "held out." See Mead v. Cutler, supra. As a result, 
there were "cases where a party in possession of real 
estate would be obliged to abandon his accustomed pos-
session and use, in order to [bring a writ of entry and] try 
the right of an adverse claimant." Munroe v. Ward, 86 
Mass. 150, 4 Allen 150, 151 (1862). In recognition of the 
fact that such abandonment "would be unreasonable and 
contrary to sound policy," the try [*13] title statute was 
enacted so that property owners might remain in posses-
sion while requiring that adverse claims be either as-
serted or disavowed rather than lingering indefinitely. Id. 
5 In determining that a plaintiff under G. L. c. 
240, §§ 1-5, must possess both record title and 
possession, the motion judge quoted Daley v. 
Daley, 300 Mass. 17, 21, 14 N.E.2d 113 (1938), 
to the effect that "[a] petition to remove a cloud 
from the title to land affected cannot be main-
tained unless both actual possession and the legal 
title are united in the petitioner." The Daley case 
is inapposite, however, because it involves a bill 
to quiet title pursuant to G. L. c. 240, §§ 6-10, ra-
ther than an action to try title pursuant to G. L. c. 
240, §§ 1-5. See generally R.W. Bishop, Prima 
Facie Case § 48.5, at 601-602 (5th ed. 2005) (in-
termingling discussion of both try title and quiet 
title cases in section entitled "Actions to Try 
Title"). 
[HN7] An action to quiet title is an in rem 
action, G. L. c. 240, §10, brought under the 
court's equity jurisdiction. See G. L. c. 185, § 
l(k); First Baptist Church of Sharon v. Harper, 
191 Mass. 196, 209, 77 N.E. 778 (1906) ("in eq-
uity the general doctrine is well settled, that a bill 
to remove a cloud [*14] from the land . . . [re-
quires that] both actual possession and the legal 
title are united in the plaintiff). In contrast, an 
action to try title is an action at law brought 
against the respondent as an individual. See G. L. 
c. 240, § 2 ("the court shall enter a decree that 
[specified adverse claimants] be forever barred 
from having or enforcing any such claim ad-
versely to the petitioner"); Clouston v. Shearer, 
99 Mass. 209, 211, 212-213 (1868) (at time try 
title statute was enacted in 1851, Massachusetts 
courts did not yet possess general equity jurisdic-
tion that would permit actions to remove cloud 
from title [not until 1852]). 
The distinction is critical because the plain-
tiff in a try title action may defeat the specified 
adverse claims through a default or by showing 
title that is merely superior to that of the respon-
dent. See G. L. c. 240, §§ 2-3; Blanchard v. Lo-
well, 177 Mass. 501, 504-505, 59 N.E. 114 
(1901). In contrast, a quiet title action requires 
the plaintiff "not merely to demonstrate better 
title to the locus than the defendants possess, but 
requires the plaintiff to prove sufficient title to 
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succeed in its action." Sheriffs Meadow Found., 
Inc. v. Bay-Courte Edgartown, Inc., 401 Mass. 
267, 269, 516 N.K2d 144 (1987). [*15] See 
U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 
645, 941 N.E.2d 40 (2011); Loring v. Hildreth, 
170 Mass. 328, 49 N.E. 652 (1898). Precedent 
applicable to one statute, although potentially 
persuasive, does not control cases brought under 
the other statute. 
Under the early versions of the try title statute the 
sole jurisdictional requirement was "actual possession 
and taking of profits" from the land. Id. at 152. See St. 
1873, c. 178; St. 1852, c. 312, § 52; St. 1851, c. 233, § 
66. Pursuant to these statutes, record or legal title to the 
property was irrelevant. See Orthodox Congregational 
Soc'y v. Greenwich, 145 Mass. 112, 113, 13 N.E. 380 
(1887) ("[M]ost of the facts. . . bear only upon the ques-
tion of title. These we need not consider"); Leary v. Duff, 
137 Mass. 147, 149-150 (1884) ("not of importance that 
the title asserted by the petitioner rests upon an alleged . . 
. adverse possession," rather than on legal title). 
These early enactments were repealed in 1893, 
however, and the modern form of the statute was 
adopted. St. 1893, c. 340. One of the principal amend-
ments was the addition of an opening clause, referring to 
"the record title of real property." St. 1893, c. 340, § 1. 
Contrast Pub. Sts. (1882), c. 176, §§ 1, [*16] 2. Almost 
immediately following the 1893 amendment, this court 
was required to consider the meaning of the new statuto-
ry language. In the case of Arnold v. Reed, 162 Mass. 
438, 38 N.E. 1132 (1894), a putative property owner 
filed a try title action alleging possession and relying on 
a recorded deed purporting to convey good title to the 
property. Id. at 439-440. The court held that mere pos-
session was no longer sufficient and that, under the new 
statute, title appearing on "the record" was also neces-
sary.6 Id at 440. The court thus read the new introducto-
ry clause as limiting the types of disputes - i.e., only 
claims based on record title ~ that might be resolved in a 
try title action. See St 1893, c. 340, § 1 ("When the 
record title of real property is clouded by an adverse 
claim"). The limitation added by the Legislature in 1893 
remains operative in the present statute and the jurisdic-
tional requirement of "record title" is thus applicable to 
Bevilacqua's claim. Compare G. L. c. 240, § 1 ("If the 
record title of land is clouded by an adverse claim . . ."), 
with St. 1893, c. 340, § 1. We turn, then, to consider Be-
vilacqua's various claims to record title. 
6 Interestingly for purposes of this [*17] pro-
ceeding, in Arnold v. Reed, 162 Mass. 438, 38 
N.E. 1132 (1894), the court was presented with a 
try title action where the plaintiff relied on a rec-
orded deed reciting that the grantor possessed 
good title. Id. at 440. "[T]he recitals [were] not 
true [however], and this would appear by an ex-
amination of the records of the Probate Court." 
Id. Accordingly, the mere recording of an instru-
ment with the registry of deeds that purports to 
transfer ownership was insufficient to create 
standing under the try title statute. Id. But see 
Connolley, petitioner, 168 Mass. 201, 203-204, 
46 N.E. 618 (1897) (petitioner had sufficient 
record title where his grantor had only 255/264th 
ownership according to registry records, 246/264 
th ownership according to wills and registry 
records, and complete but unrecorded ownership 
due to adverse possession). 
3. Standing as owner of the property.7 Bevilacqua 
alleges that he has record title to the property because he 
is the owner by virtue of a quitclaim deed granted to him 
by U.S. Bank. There appear to be two theories that un-
derpin this argument. First, the quitclaim deed may be 
sufficient by itself to support record title to the property. 
Second, if the quitclaim deed itself does not [*18] con-
stitute record title, then that instrument coupled with the 
chain of grants on which it relies is sufficient as a whole 
to demonstrate record title. The first theory is incorrect 
as a matter of law. The second theory is unpersuasive in 
light of the facts alleged by Bevilacqua. 
7 We refer in Part 3 to Bevilacqua as the owner 
of the property, using the term "owner" in a col-
loquial sense, to distinguish this analysis from 
our later consideration of Bevilacqua's claim to 
hold record title as assignee of the mortgage or as 
a bona fide purchaser without notice. 
In addressing the first theory, that a single recorded 
deed purporting to transfer title is sufficient to establish 
record title, the Land Court judge made the trenchant 
observation that such a doctrine would render the 
"Brooklyn Bridge" problem insoluble. Specifically, the 
judge wrote that "in the classic example, a litigant could 
go to the registry, record a deed to the Brooklyn Bridge, 
commence suit, hope that the true owners ignored the 
suit or . . . could not be readily located and [would thus] 
be defaulted, and secure a judgment." Leaving aside the 
fact that public property cannot be the subject of a try 
title action, see G. L. c. 240, § 5, [*19] an interpretation 
of the try title statute permitting such a result cannot be 
the law. 
We are not persuaded by this "single deed" theory 
for a number of reasons, not least of which is the fact that 
[HN8] there is nothing magical in the act of recording an 
instrument with the registry that invests an otherwise 
meaningless document with legal effect. See S & H Pe-
troleum Corp. v. Register of Deeds for the County of 
Bristol, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 535, 537, 707 N.E.2d 843 
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(1999) ("The function of a registry of deeds is to record 
documents. It is essentially a ministerial function . . ."). 
Recording may be necessary to place the world on notice 
of certain transactions. See, e.g., G. L. c. 183, § 4 (leases 
and deed); G. L. c. 203, §§ 2-3 (trust documents). Re-
cording is not sufficient in and of itself, however, to 
render an invalid document legally significant. See Ar-
nold v. Reed, 162 Mass. 438, 440, 38 N.E. 1132 (1894); 
Nickerson v. Loud, 115 Mass. 94, 97-98 (1874) ("mere 
assertions . . . whether recorded or unrecorded, do not 
constitute a cloud upon title, against which equity will 
grant relief). As a result, it is the effectiveness of a 
document that is controlling rather than its mere exis-
tence. See Bongaards v. Millen, 440 Mass. 10, 15, 793 
N.E.2d 335 (2003) [*20] (where grantor lacks title "a 
mutual intent to convey and receive title to the property 
is beside the point"). The effectiveness of the quitclaim 
deed to Bevilacqua thus turns, in part, on the validity of 
his grantor's title. Accordingly, a single deed considered 
without reference to its chain of title is insufficient to 
show "record title" as required by G. L. c. 240, § 1. 
The second theory supporting Bevilacqua's owner-
ship claim addresses this point by asserting that the chain 
of deeds recorded at the registry is sufficient to demon-
strate record title. Under this theory Bevilacqua may 
trace his chain of title back from the quitclaim deed, 
through the foreclosure deed, and ultimately to the 
mortgage granted by Rodriguez to MERS as nominee for 
Finance America. Bevilacqua has alleged, however, that 
U.S. Bank was not the assignee of the mortgage at the 
time that it purported to foreclose on the property and 
conduct a sale pursuant to the power of sale contained in 
the mortgage.8 
8 One amicus appended to its brief a copy of 
the foreclosure deed and the legal notice an-
nouncing the foreclosure sale. That foreclosure 
deed recites that "U.S. Bank National Association 
[U.S. Bank] as Trustee [is [*21 ] the] holder of a 
mortgage from Pablo Rodriguez" while the no-
tice, recorded with the foreclosure deed, states 
that "[U.S. Bank as trustee] is the present holder" 
of the mortgage. Neither of these documents is in 
evidence and, whether he relied on such repre-
sentations or not, Bevilacqua's petition directly 
contradicts the accuracy of the quoted statements. 
We rely on the facts pleaded in the petition for 
purposes of this appeal. See supra at 
As we recently held in the Ibanez case, [HN9] Mas-
sachusetts "adherefs] to the familiar rule that 'one who 
sells under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its 
terms'" so, where a foreclosure sale occurs in the absence 
of authority, "there is no valid execution of the power, 
and the sale is wholly void." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. 
Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 646, 941 N.E.2d 40 (2011), 
quoting Moore v. Dick, 187 Mass. 207, 211, 72 N.E. 967 
(1905). "One of the terms of the power of sale that must 
be strictly adhered to is the restriction on who is entitled 
to foreclose." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, supra at 
647. See Bongaards v. Millen, supra. By alleging that 
U.S. Bank was not the assignee of the mortgage at the 
time of the purported foreclosure, Bevilacqua is neces-
sarily [*22] asserting that the power of sale was not 
complied with, that the purported sale was invalid, and 
that his grantor's title was defective. See U.S. Bank Nat'l 
Ass'n v. Ibanez, supra. In light of its defective title, the 
intention of U.S. Bank to transfer the property to Bevi-
lacqua is irrelevant and he cannot have become the own-
er of the property pursuant to the quitclaim deed. See 
Bongaards v. Millen, supra. Bevilacqua's theory based 
on the chain of title is thus unpersuasive. 
In this regard we note that Bevilacqua's try title ac-
tion based on ownership of the property faces an insur-
mountable obstacle. A try title action may be brought 
only where record title is "clouded by an adverse claim, 
or by the possibility thereof." G. L. c. 240, § L However, 
the very fact that raises the possibility of an adverse 
claim - U.S. Bank's lack of authority to foreclose at the 
time it purported to foreclose ~ is fatal to Bevilacqua's 
claim to "own" the property. The basic problem is that, 
instead of presenting a potentially viable claim and 
seeking to test it against the claims of a rival, Bevilacqua 
effectively admits that he does not presently have record 
title and seeks a declaration, if Rodriguez [*23] were to 
default, that the defect is cured. In light of the pleaded 
facts it is thus impossible for us to conclude that Bevi-
lacqua's ownership theory demonstrates the jurisdictional 
facts necessary to maintain a try title action. See G. L. c. 
240, § 1. 
4. Standing as assignee of the mortgage. As an al-
ternative to the claim that he owns the property in fee 
simple, Bevilacqua argues that he holds record title be-
cause he is the assignee of the mortgage granted by Ro-
driguez to MERS as nominee for Finance America. Be-
vilacqua does not develop the argument at length but it is 
an intriguing one given that [HN10] Massachusetts is a 
"title theory" State in which "a mortgage is a transfer of 
legal title in a property to secure a debt." U.S. Bank Nat'l 
Ass'n v. Ibanez, supra at 649. If a mortgagee's legal title 
suffices to establish "record title" under G L. c. 240, § 7, 
then Bevilacqua may be able to demonstrate standing to 
proceed with this try title action. We conclude, however, 
that Bevilacqua's claim to record title as mortgagee is 
inconsistent with the relief he seeks, namely, that Rodri-
guez be compelled either to "show cause why he should 
not be required to bring an action to try title" or to "be 
[*24] forever barred from having or enforcing any claim 
in the property." Accordingly, we conclude that Bevi-
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lacqua's theory of record title as mortgagee is untenable 
and cannot support standing under G L. c. 240, § 1. 
We begin our analysis of this question by noting that 
Bevilacqua's claim to be holder of the mortgage has at 
least a plausible basis despite the fact that he has never 
taken an express assignment. This court has held that 
[HN11] it is possible for a foreclosure deed, ineffective 
due to noncompliance with the power of sale, to never-
theless operate as an assignment of the mortgage itself. 
See Holmes v. Turner's Falls Co., 142 Mass. 590, 591, 8 
N.E. 646 (1886); Dearnaley v. Chase, 136 Mass. 288, 
290 (1884); Brown v. Smith, 116 Mass. 108 (1874). The 
theory is that "where a deed of real estate shows by its 
language that it was intended to pass title by one form of 
conveyance, by which however title could not pass, 
courts have made the deed effective by construing it as a 
deed of some other form, notwithstanding the inappro-
priateness of the language." Kaufman v. Federal Nat'l 
Bank, 287 Mass. 97, 100-101, 191 N.E. 422 (1934). Be-
vilacqua argues in his brief that "the foreclosure deed 
constituted an assignment of the [*25] mortgage on the 
[property to Bevilacqua." As stated, this proposition 
cannot be correct because Bevilacqua was not a party to 
the foreclosure deed. Further, Bevilacqua has alleged that 
U.S. Bank was not the assignee of the mortgage at the 
time it executed the foreclosure deed so it is impossible 
for that instrument to be construed as an assignment of 
mortgage. See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, supra at 
654 ("Because an assignment of a mortgage is a transfer 
of legal title, it becomes effective . . . only on the trans-
fer; it cannot become effective before the transfer"). We 
assume without deciding, however, that Bevilacqua 
might be able to establish a chain of assignments passing 
from his quitclaim deed, through the "Confirmatory Fo-
reclosure Deed," through the recorded assignment from 
MERS, and thus ultimately back to Rodriguez's original 
deed of mortgage. See supra at [2-3] (regarding drawing 
of favorable inferences). We may thus assume, without 
deciding, that there is a factual basis on which Bevilac-
qua may claim to be the assignee of the mortgage. 
The title that Bevilacqua might claim as mortgagee, 
however, would be inconsistent with the relief that might 
be provided under G. L. c. 240, §§ 1-5. [*26] The prob-
lem, from Bevilacqua's perspective, arises from the na-
ture of a mortgage. [HN12] In Massachusetts, a "mort-
gage splits the title in two parts: the legal title, which 
becomes the mortgagee's, and the equitable title, which 
the mortgagor retains." Maglione v. BancBoston Mtge. 
Corp., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 88, 90, 557 N.E.2d 756 (1990). 
The purpose of the split is "to give to the mortgagee an 
effectual security for the payment of a debt [while] 
leav[ing] to the mortgagor . . . the full control, disposi-
tion and ownership of the estate." Santiago v. Alba Mgt., 
77 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 49, 928 N.E.2d 359 (2010), quot-
ing Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank v. White, 30 F. 
Supp. 416, 418-419 (D. Mass. 1939). The title held by a 
mortgagee is defeasible and "upon payment of the note 
by the mortgagor . . . the mortgagee's interest in the real 
property comes to an end." Maglione v. BancBoston 
Mtge. Corp., supra. 
Inherent in this concept of the mortgagee's defeasi-
ble title is the mortgagor's equity of redemption: 
"[T]he mortgagor's equity of redemp-
tion [is] the basic and historic right of a 
debtor to redeem the mortgage obligation 
after its due date, and ultimately to insist 
on foreclosure as the means of terminat-
ing the mortgagor's [*27] interest in the 
mortgaged real estate." 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) c. 3, Intro-
ductory Note at 97 (1996) (addressing common law ap-
plicable in both title theory and lien theory States). 
[HN13] "[A]n equity of redemption is inseparably con-
nected with a mortgage," Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332, 
337, 24 L. Ed. 775 (1877), and endures so long as the 
mortgage continues in existence: 
"When the right of redemption is fo-
reclosed, the mortgage has done its work 
and the property is no longer mortgaged 
land. Instead, the former mortgagee owns 
the legal and equitable interests in the 
property and the mortgage no longer ex-
ists." 
Santiago v. Alba Mgt., supra at 50. See G. L. c. 244, § 18 
(mortgagor holds equity of redemption until mortgagor 
forecloses); Maglione v. BancBoston Mtge. Corp., supra 
("upon payment of the note by the mortgagor . . . the 
mortgagee's interest in the real property comes to an 
end"). Following default, therefore, a mortgagee may 
enter and possess the property but his or her title remains 
subject to the mortgagor's equity of redemption. See G. 
L c. 244, §§1,2; Joyner v. Lenox Sav. Bank, 322 Mass. 
46, 52-53, 76 N.E.2d 169 & n.l (1947); Maglione v. 
BancBoston Mtge. Corp., supra at 91 (this right [*28] 
of entry and possession distinguishes title and lien theory 
States). This state of affairs persists until either the 
mortgagee brings a proceeding to foreclose on the equity 
of redemption, see Negron v. Gordon, 373 Mass. 199, 
205 n.4, 366N.E.2d241 (1977) (listing four methods of 
foreclosing equity of redemption), or until the mortgagor 
redeems the property and brings the mortgagee's interests 
in the property to an end. See Maglione v. BancBoston 
Mtge. Corp., supra at 90. See also G. L. c. 260, § 33 (li-
mitations period for foreclosure proceedings). The cru-
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cial point is that a mortgage, by its nature, necessarily 
implies the simultaneous existence of two separate but 
complementary claims to the property that do not survive 
the mortgage or each other. 
This point controls the present case because a liti-
gant who asserts that he or she is the holder of a mort-
gage necessarily asserts that the mortgage continues to 
exist and that the mortgagor's claims to the property re-
main valid. For this reason, a plaintiff in a try title action 
may be heard to claim that a mortgage no longer exists, 
that claims to the contrary are adverse, and that the puta-
tive mortgagee should be required to bring an action try-
ing the [*29] claim. See, e.g., Brewster v. Seeger, 173 
Mass. 281, 53 N.E. 814 (1899). For a plaintiff to both 
claim record title as holder of a mortgage and to dispute 
the respondent's continuing equitable title or equity of 
redemption would be oxymoronic, however, because the 
only circumstances in which the respondent's rights 
would not be upheld are circumstances in which there is 
no mortgage for the plaintiff to hold. This is the cir-
cumstance in which Bevilacqua finds himself. 
To assert that he holds legal title as mortgagee, Be-
vilacqua must necessarily accept that Rodriguez has a 
complementary claim to either equitable title (if there has 
been no default) or an equity of redemption (if default 
has occurred). In either case, and although their econom-
ic interests may diverge, Bevilacqua cannot be heard to 
argue that Rodriguez's claim is adverse to his own. This 
fact necessarily precluded Bevilacqua from establishing 
a necessary element of his try title action - the existence 
of an adverse claim.9 See G. L. c. 240, § 1 (action may be 
brought "[i]f the record title of land is clouded by an ad-
verse claim . . ."). The legal title possessed by a mortga-
gee is not, therefore, a basis of standing that would be 
consistent [*30] with maintenance of Bevilacqua's ac-
tion against Rodriguez. Accordingly, we conclude that it 
is not open to Bevilacqua to rely on such title in at-
tempting to demonstrate the necessary jurisdictional 
facts.10 
9 In addition, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
imagine what kind of action Rodriguez might 
bring to try his title as mortgagor. Presumably 
Rodriguez would assert that the purported forec-
losure sale was ineffective, that no foreclosure 
has occurred, and that he thus retains an equity of 
redemption. Bevilacqua necessarily would agree 
with these claims, having asserted that he is the 
mortgage holder, so judgment could enter on the 
pleadings declaring that Rodriguez enjoys an eq-
uity of redemption. Such an action would be 
nonsensical. 
10 Bevilacqua asserts that foreclosure is not an 
adequate remedy in these circumstances because, 
he argues with emphasis, if he "is required to fo-
reclose on the mortgage . . . to clean up his title, 
this will delay his sale or refinance for a mini-
mum of about seven to nine months." [HN14] 
Foreclosure, however, is the appropriate remedy 
for a mortgagee seeking to resolve an outstanding 
equity of redemption. See Negron v. Gordon, 373 
Mass. 199, 205 n.4, 366 N.E.2d 241 (1977) 
[*31] (listing four methods of foreclosing equity 
of redemption). Nothing contained herein is in-
tended to limit Bevilacqua's right, if he can show 
himself to be mortgagee of the property, to pur-
sue foreclosure under the appropriate statutes. 
The record does not disclose if Bevilacqua pre-
sently holds the promissory note secured by Ro-
driguez's mortgage. Whether the holder of a 
mortgage may foreclose the equity of redemption 
without also holding the note is a question that is 
not before us. 
5. Standing as bona fide purchaser for value. In con-
cluding his arguments, Bevilacqua asserts that he "could 
not have known, when he purchased the [p]roperty, that 
this title problem existed" and that as a result he must be 
permitted to proceed under the try title statute or be left 
without an adequate remedy. Certain of the amici expand 
on this point, arguing that Bevilacqua is a bona fide pur-
chaser for value and without notice such that he holds 
good title to the property. Under this theory, Bevilacqua's 
quitclaim deed transferred good title to the property that, 
in addition to his possession, satisfies the standing re-
quirements of the try title statute.11 G L. c. 240, § 1. We 
need not address the legal [*32] merits of the argument 
because Bevilacqua is not a bona fide purchaser without 
notice of the defects in his grantor's title. 
11 Bevilacqua's chain of title as a bona fide 
purchaser necessarily begins with his quitclaim 
deed from U.S. Bank. [HN15] In some States, 
"[i]t is well settled . . . that one who has only a 
quitclaim deed to land cannot claim protection as 
a bona fide purchaser without notice." Polhemus 
v. Cobb, 653 So. 2d 964, 967-968 (Ala. 1995), 
quoting Gordon v. Ward, 221 Ala. 173, 174, 128 
So. 217 (1930). "In this Commonwealth, [how-
ever,] such a deed is as effectual to transfer 
whatever title the grantor has in the premises, as a 
deed with full covenants of warranty. The con-
veyance in either form is voidable, and not void, 
if fraudulent as to creditors; and, until defeated by 
a creditor, the title of the grantor passes." Mans-
field v. Dyer, 131 Mass. 200, 201 (1881). See 
Boynton v. Haggart, 120 F. 819, 822-823 (8th 
Cir. 1903) (history and evolution of decisions re-
garding quitclaim deeds, recording statutes, and 
bona fide purchasers). If a grantor has voidable 
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title to a Massachusetts property, therefore, that 
title may pass through a quitclaim deed to a bona 
fide purchaser in whose hands the title [*33] is 
no longer voidable. 
We begin analysis of this bona fide purchaser theory 
by noting that [HN16] "[t]he law goes a great way in 
protecting the title of a purchaser for value without no-
tice or knowledge of any defect in the power of the ven-
dor to sell . . . ." Rogers v. Barnes, 169 Mass. 179, 183, 
47N.E. 602 (1897). For that reason, the purchaser's "title 
is not to be affected by mere irregularities in executing a 
power of sale contained in a mortgage, of which irregu-
larities he has no knowledge, actual or constructive." Id. 
at 183-184. There are limits to the protections provided 
to bona fide purchasers, however, and "[t]he purchaser of 
an apparently perfect record title is not protected against 
all adverse claims." Brewster v. Weston, 235 Mass. 14, 
17, 126 N.E. 271 (1920). Where the bona fide purchaser 
is not protected against an adverse claim the purchaser 
"must rely upon the covenants of his deed" rather than 
dispossession of the true owner ~ that is, there are situa-
tions in which it is the purchaser rather than the original 
owner who must seek recovery from a third person rather 
than being awarded possession of the property itself. Id. 
See 3 J. Palomar, Land Titles § 677, at 374-375 (3d ed. 
2003) (listing circumstances [*34] in which actual facts 
may rebut presumption of record title and true owner will 
prevail over innocent purchaser). 
Generally, the key question in this regard is whether 
the transaction is void, in which case it is a nullity such 
that title never left possession of the original owner, or 
merely voidable in which case a bona fide purchaser may 
take good title. See Brewster v. Weston, supra. Cf Res-
tatement (Second) of Contracts § 7 comment a (1981). 
Here, the dispute as to title revolves around the validity 
of the unauthorized foreclosure sale conducted by U.S. 
Bank. Certain of the amici argue that the category in 
which such a transaction belongs, void or merely voida-
ble, has not been addressed definitively in Massachu-
setts. Our recent decision in the case of U.S. Bank Nat'l 
Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 647, 941 N.E.2d 40 
(2011), however, concluded that [PIN 17] "[a]ny effort to 
foreclose by a party lacking 'jurisdiction and authority' to 
carry out a foreclosure under [the relevant] statutes is 
void." We decline the invitation to revisit this issue. In 
any event, a factual prerequisite - purchase by Bevilac-
qua without notice of the defects in U.S. Bank's title -
does not exist. 
Bevilacqua's petition alleges [*35] that a number of 
documents were recorded with the registry, provides the 
book and page number applicable to each document, but 
fails to provide the dates on which recording occurred. 
We take judicial notice, however, of the fact that the re-
gistry assigns book and page numbers to recorded in-
struments in a sequential manner. See Mass. G. Evid. § 
201(b) (2011). We therefore may conclude that instru-
ments with lower book and page numbers were recorded 
prior to instruments with higher book and page num-
bers.12 Here, the book and page numbers demonstrate 
recording of documents in the following order: (i) the 
mortgage from Rodriguez to MERS (executed on March 
18, 2005); (ii) the assignment of mortgage from MERS 
to U.S. Bank (executed on July 21, 2006); (iii) the pur-
ported foreclosure deed from U.S. Bank "as Trustee" to 
U.S. Bank as trustee under the servicing agreement (ex-
ecuted on June 29, 2006); (iv) the "Confirmatory Forec-
losure Deed" from U.S. Bank "as Trustee" to U.S. Bank 
as trustee under the servicing agreement (executed on 
October 9, 2006); and (v) the quitclaim deed from U.S. 
Bank to Bevilacqua (executed on October 17, 2006). We 
cannot be sure of the precise date on which the foreclo-
sure [*36] deed became a matter of public record, but 
we do know that this occurred after the assignment of 
mortgage had been recorded. As a result, Bevilacqua 
must have attempted to purchase the property from U.S. 
Bank (in some capacity) either when the registry's 
records showed the bank to be a complete stranger to 
title, when the registry's records showed the bank to be 
no more than an assignee of the mortgage, or when the 
registry's records showed that the bank conducted the 
foreclosure sale before receiving assignment of the 
mortgage. In none of these circumstances could we con-
clude that Bevilacqua is a bona fide purchaser for value 
and without notice that U.S. Bank's title was doubtful. 
See Demoulas v. Demoulas, 428 Mass. 555, 577, 703 
N.E.2d 1149 (1998) ([HN18] parties may not "establish 
themselves as bona fide purchasers simply by claiming 
that they were 'blissfully unaware' of facts to which they 
closed their eyes). We therefore are unconvinced by Be-
vilacqua's claim to record title based on the theory that 
he is a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice. 
12 A registry of deeds may employ several as-
sistant registers who process documents. It is thus 
possible, although irrelevant for purposes of this 
[*37] decision, that documents presented to dif-
ferent assistant registers at nearly the same time 
may have book and page numbers that do not re-
flect the precise order of such overlapping pres-
entations. 
6. Dismissal with prejudice. As a final matter we 
consider whether the Land Court judge properly speci-
fied that Bevilacqua's complaint be dismissed with pre-
judice. As discussed above, the precise procedural me-
chanism under which the judge decided the sua sponte 
motion to dismiss is unclear. What is clear, however, is 
that the judge's dismissal was based on lack of standing 
and thus want of subject matter jurisdiction. See Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 12 (h) (3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of 
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a party or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of 
the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action"); 
Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial 
Court, 448 Mass. 15, 21, 858 N.E.2d 699 (2006), and 
cases cited ([HN19] "The issue of standing is one of 
subject matter jurisdiction"). 
[HN20] A complaint that is dismissed for lack of ju-
risdiction is not an adjudication on the merits. See Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (3), as amended, 454 Mass. 1403 (2009) 
(involuntary dismissal or "any dismissal not provided for 
in this rule, [*38] other than a dismissal for lack of ju-
risdiction . . . operates as an adjudication upon the me-
rits"). It is thus inappropriate to attach preclusive effects 
to the dismissal beyond the matter actually decided - the 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § If at 108 (1982) ("A judgment 
may properly be rendered against a party only if the 
court has authority to adjudicate the type of controversy 
involved in the action"). The obvious rationale for this 
rule is that a court without subject matter jurisdiction 
over a controversy is without authority to issue a binding 
judgment regarding that controversy. See id. at comment 
a. The conclusion that Bevilacqua lacks standing to bring 
a try title action is thus binding on him in future actions 
but dismissal of this action for want of subject matter 
jurisdiction does not bar him from bringing other actions 
regarding title to the property. 
7. Conclusion. The Land Court judge properly raised 
the question whether Bevilacqua has record title to the 
property such that he has standing to bring a try title ac-
tion. Bevilacqua has identified no basis on which it 
might be concluded that he has record title to the proper-
ty [*39] such that a try title action may be sustained. As 
a result, the Land Court was without jurisdiction to hear 
the try title action. Dismissal of the petition was there-
fore proper. The dismissal should have been entered 
without prejudice, however, and we therefore remand to 
the Land Court for entry of judgment consistent with this 
opinion. 
So ordered. 
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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
********** 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JOHN E. SWALLOW Protecting Utah • Protecting You KIRK TORGENSEN 
Chief Deputy Chief Deputy 
May 19,2011 
Brian T. Moynihan 
President, Bank of America 
100 North Tryon St. 
Charlotte, NC 28255 
Re: ReconTrust Co., N.A. 
Dear Mr. Moynihan: 
As Attorney General for the State of Utah, I am statutorily charged with enforcing Utah's 
laws in the State of Utah. In that capacity I have determined that ReconTrust, N.A., is not in 
compliance with Utah Code §§ 57-1-21 and 57-1-23 when conducting real estate foreclosures in 
the State of Utah. 
Utah Code §§ 57-1-21(3) and 57-1-23 provide that the only valid trustees of trust deeds 
with the "power of sale" are those who are either members of the Utah State Bar or title 
insurance companies. Since ReconTrust is neither of these, all real estate foreclosures conducted 
by ReconTrust in the State of Utah are not in compliance with Utah's statutes, and are hence 
illegal. 
These code sections were passed by the Utah Legislature in 2001 and 2004 for the 
specific purpose of protecting Utah citizens in their homes when they are faced with the potential 
of a real estate foreclosure. The constitutionality of this legislation was ultimately upheld by the 
United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Shurtleff v. Kleinsmith, 571 F.3d 1033 (2009). 
It is my understanding that ReconTrust claims that as a national bank it is exempt from 
following Utah law in exercising its fiduciary powers. This office adamantly disagrees with that 
position on the basis that the section of the National Bank Act granting national banks authority 
to act in a fiduciary capacity specifically states that such authority shall be exercised only "when 
not in contravention of State or local law." 12 U.S.C. 92a(a) and (b). 
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President, Bank of America 
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Page Two of Two 
Thus, ReconTrust's exercise of fiduciary powers in the State of Utah is a violation not 
only of State law, but also applicable federal law. 
The purpose of this letter is to give you notice that the Utah Attorney General's office 
intends to enforce Utah's statutes against those conducting business in Utah, and that includes 
enforcement of the real estate trustee qualification statute. I would appreciate a response to this 
letter from you within 30 days of the date of this letter informing me of how you intend to 
proceed. I am willing to discuss this issue with you or your attorneys if you like. 
Sincerely, 
arkLTShurtlefF 
tah Attorney General 
MLS/se 
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